
'Christianity Without Belief in Creation'

I

[523] From the point of view of the history of ideas, two things are characteristic of Christianity's understanding of human life. The individual is placed in a relationship to the other-worldly. Human life and its world are created. The interrelationship of these two elements constitute the problematic which in theology is called the biblical image of man.

It is characteristic of our situation, still understood in terms of the history of ideas, that the relationship of Christian faith to the other-worldly is accentuated in such a way that the idea that human life is created threatens to become a claim that is retained after all, because one very well knows that it does belong with Christianity, but retained without playing any role. One can see that this is the case from what one finds threatened in the Christian faith. Indeed we precisely live in a culture in which an irreligious understanding of our life and our world becomes more and more self-evident. The opposition between Christianity and the understanding of human life, history, nature, the universe, time and eternity – put briefly of ontology – that is given with our cultural consciousness, is getting sharper and sharper. If one now asks, where the Christian finds his faith challenged, and where the contest lies, the answer is clear enough: everything is concentrated on the irreligious ontological challenge to the conception of individual existence involving the other-worldly. But is the irreligious ontology not also a denial that our life and world is created? Yes, but this is not taken as a challenge. It does not call for any controversy. In reality, one here gives way to the irreligious ontology. Outside the existential decision of the Christian faith, there is nothing that invites the thought of creation.

In other words, nihilism is the challenge. This is shown by the fact that theology goes along with nihilism as far as it is possible to do so. The ways only part at one place, in the decision that the individual [524] has to make with his existence at stake, and that is a decision on whether the darkness and incomprehensibility that on all sides restricts our life is nothingness and meaninglessness, or is God. But to follow nihilism this far, one must have abandoned the idea of creation. Outside the existential decision of Christian faith, our life and world is understood atheistically.

In short, from the way in which preaching and theology take up the confrontation which the irreligious ontology of our time forces upon it, we can see that it is known that Christianity is the requirement of the other-worldly on the existence of the individual, but the fact is ignored that Christianity is also an understanding that our life and world is created. The idea of creation falls short, not to say that it is got rid of altogether.

But this is still only a statement of a fact concerning the history of ideas. Can anything be said about how it has come to this point?
II

I will point to a single factor. If one wants to fix an understanding, including a religious understanding, one cannot escape confrontations and comparisons; this must be done, in order to give the understanding a shape. This is thus how people have behaved in relation to the Judeo-Christian understanding of human life, which is contrasted to that of the Greeks.

But however indispensable confrontations and comparisons are, they obviously harbour their own dangers. One makes the difference too cut and dried, too unequivocal. And the question is whether one has not made the difference between the Greeks and the Biblical so unequivocal that belief in creation has failed.

The case is often made in the following way: By placing the individual in a relationship to the other-worldly, Christianity released the individual from the world in which he was surrounded and emplaced in the Greek understanding. The relationship to the other-worldly set the individual apart from the world, made him independent of it, gave him a whole new power over it, just as the world was deprived of its divinity by the same faith in God’s other-wordliness; it was not God, but God’s creation, subjugated by human beings. In this way, Christianity gave the human being a consciousness of freedom and feeling of sovereignty, which he had not known in any other culture.

Unlike the people of the bible, the Greek people lived incorporated in a world that was animated and divine. The Greeks knew nothing of the insecurity which is produced by such great freedom as Christianity gave the human being. Nor of the [525] Christians’ consciousness of power. The Greek relation to the world was contemplation, not subjugation and domination.

Formulated ethically one can put the difference as follows: Christianity makes the life of human beings into an existence in decisions. The individual stands in the choice between whether he will find the meaning of his life in the world, in what it has to offer and in what he can achieve in it, or whether, released from the world, dead to it, he lets the meaning of his life be given by God, beyond the world. In Greek ethics, on the other hand, the ethical life consists in developing the possibilities that are given with the essence of the human being in pursuit of proper goals. To put it in terms of watchwords, the difference is fixed as a difference between ‘decision’ and ‘unfolding’.

It is beyond doubt that with this is said not only something important, but the decisive thing about the difference between the Biblical and the Greek points of view. Nevertheless, I cannot get away from noting that, if we hold to the result of this confrontation, we are guilty of a simplification. The difference between the Biblical and the Greek remains exceedingly clear and unequivocal, as long as one keeps to the element in the Biblical view of the human being that consists of the fact that the individual is placed in a relationship to the other-worldly. And it is as if, in order not to disturb the clarity that has been gained, one ignores the other element, namely belief in creation. One keeps to what one cannot be mistaken about, namely that the Judeo-Christian faith in the
other-worldly God is opposed to the Greek understanding of the world as animated and divine. It is as if one had abandoned the task of considering what lies in the idea of human life and the world as created, because one would then easily slip into the path of Greek thinking and thereby obliterate the difference between the Greek and Biblical picture of the human being. If one says something about what the created possibilities of the human being consist of, is not the ethical life then immediately understood as a Greek unfolding of the human being’s inherent possibilities – and thus no longer as a Christian existence in decisions?

Nevertheless, the theologian faces the task of deliberating on what it means that life and the world is created, and delving into the confrontation which is forced on him by the irreligious ontology’s denial of a belief in creation, even if he runs the risk of blurring the unequivocal distinction between the Greek and the Biblical.

Even in the history of ideas, this task arises. Namely if the historians of ideas are right, whose thinking I have hinted at, then our consciousness of power, our feeling of sovereignty, our will to form and shape, has been strengthened to a high degree in Christianity – and has been strengthened precisely through the relationship to the other-worldly, in which the Christian preaching and faith has placed the individual. Christianity has placed our power, sovereignty and will to form out into the open, and given them the entire profane world as an object and raw material without letting them know any limits, without confining them anywhere. But this is to say, that Christianity has been a misfortune for our Western culture. Why? Because we have taken its strengthening of our power, freedom, sovereignty and will to form out of the tension it stands in with the understanding of our life and world as created, as Christianity conceives things, but which we have pushed into the background, disregarded as nothing more than a dogma we carry along as extra baggage.

III

However the Greek understanding relates itself to the world's divinity, for the Judeo-Christian faith it is beyond our ability and power to know and meet God in the world. On the other hand, it does not exceed human ability and power to know that the world is God's. How come? That indeed is the question.

That life and the world are created cannot just be a theory concerning their origin or an explanation of their power to be. But first and foremost it must mark life in its realization and our world in our experience of it. I shall try to make clear what is meant by this in various ways, and take my starting point in a story, ‘Beyond the Sacred’, by Jørgen Nielsen. This is a psychological portrayal of a man, who has decided to murder his wife, but instead has a breakdown. Nima Collmann, composer and virtuoso, is described as a person who fills every feeling, every mood, every experience with himself and his own ability in a ruthless will – bordering on insanity – to enrich his own being and art. Everything grows wild in him, both good and evil, and with the same delight, he watches it become powerful within himself, simply because it is himself. He has achieved genius in a vehement and insatiable will to the impossible which has therefore become his being.
What he has achieved, he has achieved by stepping out beyond all the limits which his surroundings have tried to stake out for him, in order at last to be the only one proved right. This has happened through humiliation, insults and privations, and it has operated so deeply that to be proved right has become 'his being's disease and agitated centre'. 'Deep within him, it trembled always from outrage and hectic, overweening confidence'.

In his eyes, his wife is a tired woman, having aged early, without the ability to feel joy. Her life was without worth, because the only reality for him was how much one felt. He had at one time loved her passionately [527], but now it had become stale for him. It had become everyday, and he hated the everyday. He wants to love greatly once again, and because his wife stands in the way of this, he decides to murder her. He had never been in doubt that at the core of things, the sweet innermost fruit of life, was something evil. 'It was the wicked human beings, who had this unmistakable stamp of knowing what is central'. It would be illogical that his wife's 'half-careworn days should hinder the fulfillment of his great longings'. He is an addict, even if he controls his addiction, his nature is no longer capable of distinguishing between small and great things.

He has laid his plot. Each evening he brings his wife a sleeping pill, and he has placed a tablet with a more permanent effect on the top. His wife suffers from a heart ailment. Her doctors know this, as do her acquaintances, so no one will suspect anything. He foresees that he will have a breakdown, and that the breakdown will be genuine but also expedient. And now they sit talking amicably together in a hotel room during one of his concert tours.

A triviality – that his wife stretches the time out a bit and does not go to bed at the time she usually does – causes his world of appearances to break down. Because everything does not go according to plan, he discovers that it is with terror that he awaits her demise. Because something goes awry, a sudden reversal occurs. His feeling of power is torn to shreds, and he is left in the lurch by his reflection upon everything he has so artfully built up. He becomes another person. 'The man who has planned the crime, and the one who should now bear to see it executed, become two very different beings'.

But he does not give up. The fanatical man of will in him struggles with all the anxiety and horror that flows over him. In torment and rage, he struggles with the terror in himself. He only wants this one thing – to hold out. And all the while he continues speaking, apparently calmly, to his wife. But with an observation – 'You look so strange', which she said without thinking anything about it – their glances meet. He cannot avert his eyes. In her eyes, anxiety grows, a madness binds them together, paralyzes them, fills the world, which becomes frighteningly silent, and whether it is because she reads the whole truth in his eyes, or because she accidently hits on the half-truth in her anxiety, she whispers in an indescribably desperate tone: 'You are indeed crazy. You want to kill me'. Then his will breaks. He gives up his intention and he gives himself up. His strength leaves him and he confesses everything. Unrepentant but annihilated. What he has believed was the ultimate and innermost truth, [528] upon which one could live and die, namely that we know nothing and that nothing is true, was nothing more than a high-minded remark. He experienced something else, a superior power. 'Unknown forces had crushed him'. He breaks down in tears, 'ghastly, unnatural, horrible tears. It was as if he had died of disgust.
with himself as he cried’. ‘He had gone beyond the limits of being a human being’. His life-nerve was killed. From that he realized that the sacred was sacred and that he had offended against it.

The story ends with a brief observation that the daily newspapers later report the famous man’s return to the Church. This was not meant by the author as a recommendation of Nima Collmann or the Church. The words ‘to the Church’ are repeated, and the repetition is an expression of contempt.

It is an ordinary view in our day that the difference between good and evil, love and hate, compassion and cruelty, has no ontological status. The difference has no basis in life as this is given to us. Rather, it is our production alone. Ethical distinctions first come into existence in our human-civil sphere, they arise first in and with our evaluation. Not least in Anglo-Saxon thinking, in positivism, which the political upheaval on the European continent in the thirties banished and made into a largely Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, so that this is now a common view, also incidentally in Scandinavian thinking. And the irreligious ontology of our time consists for a large part in this. It seems to me, however, that Jørgen Nielsen’s story refutes this. Perhaps this was not his intention. He was not a religious, much less a Christian, writer, but that does not matter. His story is constructed psychologically. But precisely because his psychological description of Nima Collmann is so penetrating and exact, he cannot remain on the psychological plane but is forced onto the ontological, which he does not even try to conceal.

When Nima Collmann no longer in fantasy, reflection and planning but in deed must assault the life of another human being, he is filled with a horror which he had not for a moment contemplated. It does not happen that, when the actual deed is at hand, he finds sympathy for his wife, or that something of his former love renews itself, or that amicable feelings have returned to him and achieved power in his mind. No, it is nothing of this nature that brings on his sudden reversal. What occurs does not belong to the human-civil sphere. It is life itself, another human being’s life which rises up in its inviolability. A powerless inviolability – for Collmann can murder his wife – but an [529] inviolability nevertheless in that he cannot do it without committing sacrilege and annihilating himself. Life’s own inviolability makes itself felt in his horror, in his complete spiritual breakdown. The difference between good and evil shows itself to be of ontological status, given with the life that is created.

IV

The idea of his own absolute power, which Nima Collmann lives in, is insane, his plot abnormal. But also normal, bourgeois approved evil does violence to creation. It does not shake us, because we have become accustomed to it. But there may also be another reason. Even if we consider that our life and the world are created, we live in a false understanding of this.

The false understanding consists in this, that only what is beyond our power and so outside our grasp can be created. This is the current understanding, and therefore what
is created is shrunk down, while our sphere of power is extended enormously. What do we not master, in insight and technology! What can we not organize, extract, exploit! What can we not achieve! The area of the created shrinks and shrinks, the more we have in our grasp. No doubt we know that much remains both in our world and in our own life, that places limits on our power and sets a check on our encroachments. There continues to be much which surpasses our abilities. Yet whatever we can get our hands on and control cannot be created. We are thus not taking it for granted that we ourselves are created creatures, but conversely we are taking our power, freedom and will for granted and from that point of departure what is created is understood as that which we cannot gain power over, which is not subordinated to our freedom and which we cannot force at will. What is created becomes nothing other than a kind of residuum, and what remains is really only being as matter. Only what is formless or without shape can possibly be what is created. The reason is that we live preoccupied with what we ourselves, individually or collectively, have achieved or are about to have achieved. Our results and our goals constitute the horizon of our lives. We give it no thought, that everything we owe to ourselves, we have accomplished and achieved from the grace of that which we do not owe to ourselves. We live in a wholly fantastic forgetfulness of what is given to us. It is reduced to the material. Our irreligious preoccupation with results and goals correlates with our irreligious conception concerning what is given to us, and which we do not owe ourselves, is nothing but raw material. Life is matter – matter for culture, nothing else.

However, this understanding is false. What is created lies open to our grasp and intervention. We have the freedom and power to destroy it. It has form and shape and is something determinate in itself. What is nearest, the most fragile [530] outside us and within us, which unresistingly lets itself be beaten down, what it is the smallest thing in the world to root out, can be created. But from where do we know whether this is so? We know this from the fact that we cannot take it into possession, cannot change it, cannot give it another form, without destroying it. It sets limits on our will to master it. Note that this does not mean that we are not able to push through the limits; we can and we do; but it means that we cannot exceed them except through a destruction of things and life around us and in us.

We know that our life and world is created from the destruction which out overstepping of certain limits has as the consequence. Every thing, every possibility of life, sets its limits. We do not always know where the limit lies and what overstepping the limit means, for we are often callous in our vandalism and extermination. Nor is it always to be determined rationally. That there is an extermination which interferes with the biological balance, one can see rationally and we therefore refrain from that. However, can we get away with the extermination of animal species which are not use to us for that reason? Thorkild Bjørnvig believes not. In the poem 'Day and Night' he listens to the cuckoo's call and counts the years mankind has left. What is he counting? The animal species! Why does their extermination mean our end? Because the grace of animals must exist in order to make our body free in its movements. Without the animal, the animal in us becomes coarse, blind, perverse. Our extinction of animal species is a blasphemous disdain for creation.
V

It goes without saying that no proof that our life and world is created can be given. It is possible only to refer to what raises the question, and what invites the thought. Thus not least from the realization of our life’s possibilities, we know that our life and world is created. That mother's and child’s life together is created manifests itself in the fact that in caring for her children, a woman realizes her being as a mother, so there is no conflict between what she owes herself and her child. With this, it is not to be denied that there are conflicts, on the contrary: precisely when you consider how many and how deep are the conflicts in the connection between parent and child, it is clear that we live in life possibilities for which we do not have ourselves to thank, nor for their realization. And just the same is true of all the other particular relationships between us. That the opposite isn’t true is obvious. The fundamental thing is not the conflicts between the mother and child [531], for now to stay with that example, when the relationship is peaceful, it is not because it is based on a neutralizing of the two parties’ conflicting demands for self-realization and happiness. If that were the case, our relationships would be a lot more labile than they are. Every conflict would blast the parties apart and make life a lot more enervating than in fact it is. No, if we take into account our self-circling, our pursuit of happiness and joy in power, and all the conflicts that they cause, it is astonishing how well our life in relationships with others manages to go. One would not expect this. This can only be because we live on what we do not owe ourselves.

VI

The idea of creation is also invited by an epistemological consideration. Without trust, a human being would not know what it is to talk with another human being. He would not be able to experience this, as surely as talking with another person is to trust that what is said is understood as it was meant. But this is to say that the type of conversation where we are wary of one another and which is full of one person’s suspicion towards the other could not have come about without the power of trust. Suspicion lives at the expense of trust, the evil will to overcome the other is parasitic on the created possibility of life.

Or: We would not be able to understand another's misfortune without compassion or mercy being possibilities of life; therefore without them Schadenfreude at the other’s misfortune would not be possible. Schadenfreude lives at the expense of and through a breakdown of the understanding’s access to the misfortune of the other, which we can attain only through compassion and mercy.

But this means that without the life possibilities that have been created for us, realizing themselves, regardless of our will and in spite of it, we could not have anything to do with one another – not even in evil. Without the power that they have in our lives, we could not be – not even in our malice.
VII

I now return to the question of the relation between the two elements in the Judeo-Christian understanding of the life of human beings. In his relation to the other-worldly, the individual is placed under a radical demand. As Kierkegaard expresses it, eternity belongs with the individual’s existence as an infinite demand on it. But if we now also think we can acquire an understanding that life is created, have we not got two determinations [532] of the good: the good is both obedience to the radical demand and a realization of our created possibilities of life? I would answer no to this. Only with the realization of the created possibilities of life can the radical demand be obeyed. The two elements in the biblical picture of humanity belong together, they cannot be pulled apart.

To the demand’s radicality corresponds the fact that the ways of being through which alone it can be obeyed – for example, through truthfulness, fidelity, love – are complete in themselves. Either one is this way, or one is not. A truthfulness that is partial, is mendacity. A fidelity that limits itself, is faithlessness. A love, that requires something in return, is unlovingness.

Another thing is that what goes under the name of truthfulness, fidelity and love, is often only mendacity, faithlessness and unlovingness, that by external expectations are forced to mask themselves in acts that otherwise manifest truthfulness, faithfulness and love. This is the case when a person's hatred does not get him to commit murder, when in spite of his mendacity he does not commit perjury, when his vindictiveness does not get him to commit an assault.

But when it is not actions in an external and prescribed way that are demanded, but – more demandingly – the whole person, then it must be with what life is in itself that the demand is obeyed. Obedience can never be complete if it does not realize possibilities of life that are already given to the individual; they must correspond to the demand. Obedience cannot be complete just through a bare will to obedience. Man must be more than obedient in order to be obedient, he must be merciful, faithful, truthful, trusting. The demand does not produce the possible ways to be with which it can be obeyed; they are there already.

One could very well say, that they are grounded in the human being. But this view is not therefore the Greek view. The difference is clear enough. The created possibilities of life – mercifulness, forgiveness, for example – belong wholly in life itself in the instant. If taken out of the instant and turned into the deliberate goals of action, then they thereby become means, and they are basically and fundamentally corrupted. They simply do not tolerate being used for a purpose, as in that instant they are destroyed. If mercifulness is a means to anything, it is no longer mercifulness. If there is an aim in forgiveness, how then shall the forgiven person be able to rely on it?

What a human being is created to be should not be a purposeful effort of unfolding, but fulfilment in an instant. It can therefore precisely not be trained as a virtue. The virtues are character traits that are acquired through habituation. Created possibilities of life are realized.
[533] And that the relationship to the other-worldly places people in the always present
decision, whether they will obey or disobey, corresponds to the way that obedience
consists in a way of being which wholly and completely belongs to the moment.

By contrast in Greek ethics, the good unfolds in pursuit of a goal. It does not belong to the
moment. The conception is cultural, in our eyes. Aristotle is sober-minded, none of the
created possibilities of life, whose realization belongs to the instant, belong to the virtues.

VIII

Finally, a polemic against a Danish theological standpoint. When the only thing
Christianity has to say about human life is that it consists in a relation to the other-
worldly, while the idea that it is created is ignored, then God from beyond only has to do
with man in his obedience and disobedience, but has nothing to do with man’s life and
world apart from this. He is not creator. This will have the effect that the individual’s
obedience to the demand of the other-worldly God consists in nothing but passing the
demand on to the other person. The only meaning of life together with the other is to help
him to live his life in the same obedience to the demand of the other-worldly. The only
ethical action is to aim to get the other to live ethically. It cannot be an action such as
facilitating another’s health, because health is not the same as living ethically, so that this
action cannot be called good. Kierkegaard has drawn the conclusion: love of neighbour
consists in helping the neighbour to love God.

By contrast things turn out differently if the idea that human life and the world are
created is considered to form part of Christianity. The created life precisely consists also
in something other than obedience; it consists also in bringing all kinds of life possibilities
to development and unfolding. An action therefore also becomes good by promoting
another person’s expressions of life- and in this way serving created life. Love of
neighbour can for example consist in helping the sick to become well, and does not just
consist in only helping him to love God. One is tempted to call the created life in its ethical
irrelevance a heathen life – to put the point sharply. Then the point can be expressed by
saying that because the idea of creation truly belongs to Christianity, the ethical demand
which man is put under in his relationship to the other-worldly also exists or the sake of
the created, pagan life.

But there is yet another result of insisting on the claim that the relation to the other-
worldly drives the idea of creation out of Christianity [534], and it consists in this, that
the Christian position on any cultural problem can be nothing other than hindsight. The
result can be studied in the Danish Tidehvervvi movement. There, one does not allow
oneself generally to engage in cultural tasks on a par with politicians, scientists and
philosophers or whoever deals with the problems. But when the others have done their
work, the theologian comes along afterwards to correct it and to state that he, if he had
not been a theologian, but a politician, psychiatrist, jurist or philosopher, would have
done the work much better thanks to the understanding of responsibility that his relation
to the other-worldly has given him. He is always wiser than the politician, scientist or
philosopher, not because with expertise he competes with their expertise, or not because he will say (what it is today important to say), that expertise is not enough and that philosophy is needed too – but because he has hindsight. And of course without expertise he is cleverer than the experts and without philosophy cleverer than the philosopher, since it is to our Lord that he owes his hindsight. That is the reason why the cultural confrontation has failed, which Tideherv had announced that it would begin after the internal church confrontation had been successful and was come to an end (and could be handed over to those who just reiterate its views).

The only interest that the Tideherv theologian has in the cultural problem is to reveal that the non-Christian solution is full of bad religion. And it is clear why it is his only interest. When love of the neighbour can never consist in anything other than helping the neighbour to love God, then love, when it concerns the neighbour who deals with the cultural problems, cannot consist in anything other than revealing that the politician has made the welfare state into a religion, that the psychiatrist has done likewise with therapy and the legal philosopher with the social, and so on. By revealing this the theologian helps, as well as he can, to get the politician, psychiatrist, the legal philosopher, to love God. Lately it has become a pure fashion. Without an address (‘the welfare state’ for example is too little to constitute an address) and without documentation, which one does not take any trouble about, one constructs an opponent whose religiosity one hackles away at, and whose anonymity one uses to attach to him all sorts of follies.

By contrast, if the understanding that life and the world is created is part of Christianity, then Christians and non-Christians find themselves on the same level when it comes to all cultural problems. The idea of creation precisely belongs to what is universal in Christianity (and not to those things in Christianity which are historical, unforeseen events). That life is created is an understanding of how it actually is. Therefore in so far as the theologian deals [535] with what is universal in Christianity, he has to do with the same reality as the philosopher. Here we are therefore talking about a real confrontation and conflict, albeit one that must be kept not theological but philosophical, concerning what is philosophically the right analysis.

Moreover there is a criterion for whether the theologian has taken the thought of creation seriously, and this is whether he has been able to forgo the word creation. The word has never been lacking in the theological vocabulary, but its presence has too often been a testimony to the fact that one has not thought about it. Yes, but how is it even possible to refrain from using the word? Indeed, it can be done because today we can only gain an understanding of what it means, that life and the world are created, through a confrontation with the irreligious ontology that disputes it. And the more we conduct the confrontation on a purely philosophical basis in purely phenomenological analyses in an unconditional concern with concrete phenomena and problems, the more soberly we have conducted our work, and the more redundant the word ‘created’ has been. I have here not respected the criterion, because my reflections have been programmatic.

Translated by Hans Fink and Robert Stern
Translators’ notes

1 *Vindrosen* was the leading Danish literary and cultural magazine. Its editors in 1962 were the author Klaus Rifbjerg and the philosopher Villy Sørensen.

2 *Løgstrup* repeats this discussion in sections I and II in *Creation and Annihilation* (1968) with minor alterations, the text of which is partially translated by Russell L. Dees in volume 1 of the English edition of *Løgstrup’s Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995); see pp. 338-42. We have largely followed Dees’s translation in our version here, and in the other cases noted below, but with some changes.

3 The Danish term *Løgstrup* uses here is ‘tilværelse’, which could also be translated as ‘existence’, and indeed both terms are used by the translators of the English edition of *The Ethical Demand*, while Dees also uses ‘existence’ here. *Løgstrup* also uses ‘tilværelse’ as his translation of Heidegger’s term ‘Dasein’.

4 *Løgstrup* also repeats this discussion in *Creation and Annihilation*: see pp. 82-85.

5 The rest of this section also corresponds to several paragraphs in *Creation and Annihilation*: see pp. 158-60.

6 *Tidehverv* was (and is) an influential movement within the Danish church with its own journal with the same name. It was founded in 1926 as a reaction against the sentimental and pietistic Christianity of movements like YMCA. Theologically it was strongly influenced by Kierkegaard but also the dialectical theology of Karl Barth and the existential theology of Rudolph Bultmann in Germany. *Løgstrup* was closely connected with the movement for a time but finally broke with it in 1961. When *Løgstrup* attacks Kierkegaard in the Polemical Epilogue in *Den etiske fordring* (1956) and in his *Opgør med Kierkegaard* (1968) this is very much meant as an attack also on the theological basis for the Tidehverv-movement and contemporary Danish theologians like Kristoffer Olesen-Larsen and Johannes Sløk.