EDITORIAL

This is the first issue of the Newsletter edited by the Løgstrup Archive. It appears in an electronic as well as in a paper version and will automatically be sent to subscribers in the Løgstrup Archive’s mailing list.

This newsletter will come out twice a year, in spring and autumn, and it is one of the means by which the Løgstrup Archive seeks to achieve its goal: to promote the acquaintance with and the study of K.E. Løgstrup’s thinking. The concrete purpose of this newsletter is to inform about subjects that may be of interest to people who are concerned with Løgstrup’s ideas. It will typically cover subjects like: research projects, courses, conferences, publications and, last but not least, the possibilities for research at the Løgstrup Archive. Moreover, we intend this newsletter to become a place for the publication of brief contributions to the discussion of Løgstrup’s ideas.

It goes without saying that the success of the newsletter to a great extent depends on cooperation with the readers. We therefore invite you to send us information about relevant subjects and other contributions that are suited to be published in a medium like this. We should also be glad to receive your feedback on this newsletter, especially in this initial phase, where we have much to learn.

We conclude by expressing the hope that the newsletter may stimulate the study of the intellectual heritage of one of the most important Danish thinkers of the twentieth century.
THE TWO-EDGED PEN

Critical Remarks on the Chapter "Poetry and Ethics" from Løgstrup's
The Ethical Demand

by David Bugge, Ph.D. Student, Faculty of Theology, University of Aarhus

Through poetry, both the poet and the reader signify their agreement with existence, and rhyme and rhythm are the bluntest ways of eliciting consent.

Milan Kundera: Life is Elsewhere

The essay below is meant as a short introduction to the chapter on "Poetry and Ethics" from Løgstrup's The Ethical Demand, which might provide a background for further discussion. The introduction does not pretend to be a complete account of the chapter, but it will include a representation of the most central lines of thought as well as an accentuation of what I consider to be the strengths and the weaknesses of the chapter.

If it happens that the weaknesses should dominate (and I am afraid they will), it is not due to a general disapproval of Løgstrup’s effort to connect ethics and literature. Indeed, I consider this effort to be of the most profitable in Løgstrup’s ethics. It stems, rather, from the fact that Løgstrup in this chapter leaves his specific psychological and literary analyses in favour of more generalizing and abstract reflections on the topic. In so doing he puts forward some claims of principle that often do not hold water.

This, however, does not mean that the chapter is not worth reading. On the contrary, it forces the reader into making his own critical reflections. And after all, Løgstrup wanted to be read this way: critically, not as a prophet.

The chapter is divided into two parts, which in different ways attempt to demonstrate the intimate affinity between poetry and ethics. The first attempt might be characterized as synchronous as Løgstrup looks at poetry and ethics as two parallel interpretations of life that converge in their common overcoming of triviality. The latter attempt might correspondingly be denominated as diachronic as he tries here to show that the ethical understanding of life originates in the poetic understanding of life.

I.

Løgstrup takes as his point of departure a book by the German historian of literature Johannes Pfeiffer, Between Poetry and Philosophy (Zwischen Dichtung und Philosophie, Bremen 1947). Here Pfeiffer makes a comparison between conversation and poetry. In spite of the

---

1 The essay is a slightly revised version of a requested paper delivered at the international workshop on The Significance of K.E. Løgstrup's Ethics, 8-12 May 2002 at The Sandbjerg Estate, Denmark. The workshop primarily concentrated on works translated into English, i.e., The Ethical Demand (Notre Dame/London 1997) and a few other texts. Hence my particular concentration on this very chapter among Løgstrup's numerous other - and generally better - contributions to the interdisciplinary borderland between literature and ethics.
fact that poetry has divorced itself from the corporeal expression of conversation (tone and gesture), there is still something about poetry which is akin to it. To the corporeal tone of conversation correspond timbre and rhythm, and to the corporeal gesture of conversation correspond image and metaphor.

However, pointing out this similarity is not an end in itself for Løgstrup. He is going to use Pfeiffer's observations for something, i.e., for drawing attention to the expression aspect of poetry. Just as the expression of conversation (tone and gesture) is important to our understanding of its statement - how a person says something guides our understanding of what he says - thus the expression of poetry (timbre and rhythm, image and metaphor) guides our understanding of the content of poetry.

But why does the poet express himself by means of timbre and rhythm, image and metaphor? Why does he give his poem a fixed and beautiful form?

An immediate answer would be that it is due to his aesthetic need and talent. But this reason cannot be sufficient. In that case beauty would be connected with the content and not, as Løgstrup suggests, exclusively with the poetic form and the cognition involved. The content, the theme of poetry would then be limited to things beautiful and pleasant and could not be the ugly and the hopeless. Why not? Because, according to Løgstrup, it would be perverse to give beautiful expression to the ugly and the hopeless simply for the sake of the beautiful expression. The only sober thing to do in such case would be to curb one's aesthetic need.

To me it seems that Løgstrup here abandons his usual inquiring openmindedness in favour of the mere postulate that closes the discussion for further questioning. And typically for his moving from the argument to the postulate, it is reflected in his language, which approaches the moralizing: perverse, sober, curb.

But, for one thing, who says that the poet is not a pervert? How does Løgstrup know that the poet shares his dislike of turning the ugly and the hopeless into something beautiful at the very level of the content? And is it possible at all to keep up such a sharp distinction between form and content?

For another, would this necessarily be unsober? Might a transformation of the ugly and the hopeless into the beautiful, on the contrary, not be what makes the ugly and the hopeless endurable and possible to live with? Perhaps the ugliness and the hopelessness of naked reality is so unbearable that we need the aestheticizing to make it bearable - both as poets and as readers. It may be one of the principal duties of the beautiful form to blur the ugliness and the hopelessness of life and death and in this way to soothe our anxiety.2

Such a genuine ethical matter, however, does not appear on Løgstrup's horizon. Instead he introduces the "false exclusive disjunction" (to use one of his own favourite expressions) between a cynical (perverse) l'art pour l'art position and the idea of the revelatory nature of poetry. For the crux of the matter is: Løgstrup's analysis of poetry in

---

2 Cf. Chantal's character sketch of her advertising manager in Kundera's Identity: "He likes to tell about how in the nineteen twenties, in Germany or somewhere, there was a movement for a poetry of the everyday. Advertising, he claims, is realizing that poetic project after the fact. It transforms the simple objects of life into poetry. Thanks to advertising, everydayness has started singing." (London 1999, p. 25) Hence his (but not Kundera's, I should think) enthusiastic applause of the advertising (poetic) strategy: "We put make-up on desolation!" (p. 133).
this chapter is about cognition rather than ethics. Or more precisely: Løgstrup could hardly imagine that truth and goodness came into conflict with one another.

For what is, according to Løgstrup, the real reason why the poet expresses himself by means of timbre and rhythm, image and metaphor? Why does he give his poem a beautiful form? Because some impressions and experiences are so strong that they cannot be expressed in free form. In the poetic experience the world reveals itself in such an intense way that only the beautiful and fixed form is able to express the experience precisely. A free form could hardly articulate it. The intensity would simply be lost.

So the beautiful form is the means for revelation and nearness as beauty causes the things and the world to appear in a more essential way than in our ordinary approach to them. Beauty removes the filter of triviality through which we normally see things. Triviality is false, unclear, and imprecise. But the beautiful form tears away the veil from the reader’s eyes so that he is released from the dullness of habit, and the world can make its appearance in a new - and truer - manner.

Løgstrup here calls attention to a very important aspect of poetic cognition. While, in our busy everyday lives, we usually hurry past things paying them no attention, the beautiful form compels us to stop short to take a closer look and to see things as they really are.

But Løgstrup seems to miss the point that the beautiful form might have the opposite effect, too. Life can appear so ugly, fate so cruel that the very writing process becomes a way of dealing with grief. By putting into words life in its cruelty, by persistently fixing the harsh realities on paper, the poet might gain his foothold and come to terms with life as it is.

In this process the beautiful form can thus not only become an eye opener, but also a distraction. The beautiful form can become an obstacle in presenting death, pain, and grief in all their ugliness. Beauty can blur reality and in that way weaken the process of dealing with grief, so that the poet’s struggle during his writing process becomes a struggle against the pitfalls of beauty.

Summing up, it seems that the beautiful form is double-faced as regards cognition. Firstly, it may be blurring, which ethically may have either a positive function: to soothe our anxiety, or a negative function: to prevent us from realizing our situation and thereby from coping with it.

3 It is a complex of problems that has increasingly occupied the Danish poet Henrik Nordbrandt. After the sudden death of his beloved girl friend, the purpose of his writing was to understand the ugliness of her death, to realize that she was really dead - in order to cope with the fact by this realization. And in this realization process the beautiful form occurred as a steady obstacle that was to be surmounted. Therefore Nordbrandt’s project can be summed up in the programmatic title of one of his poems: "Disgust at Rhyme" from the collection The Serpents [or even better: Worms] at the Gate of Heaven ("Væmmelse ved rim", Ormene ved himlens port, Copenhagen 1995). And, apparently, Løgstrup has not seen the origin of this disgust.

Cf. the following passage from Kundera’s Life is Elsewhere: "In rhyme and rhythm resides a certain magic power. An amorphous world becomes at once orderly, lucid, clear, and beautiful when squeezed into regular meters. Death is chaotic. But if a woman of weary of breath has gone to her death, dying becomes harmoniously integrated into the cosmic order.” (New York 1974, p. 179)
Secondly, and the other way round, the beautiful form may be the means of revelation of truth. This again may ethically have a negative function: violently to force on us an unbearable truth, or a positive function: to remove the blurring filter of triviality and make us face reality.

Løgstrup seems to have an eye only for this last function of the beautiful form. But why is the aesthetic overcoming of triviality ethical? How exactly does Løgstrup manage to make a relation between poetry and ethics? He does so by means of the concept of triviality. The antithesis of poetry is triviality as already mentioned. However, triviality is not only an aesthetic category. It is also an ethical one. Triviality is the complacent indifference where people cultivate one another's self-righteousness so that regardless of what is being related - accidents, crimes, illnesses, or deaths - it is recounted with the most self-satisfied and indifferent tone of voice.

Løgstrup's reflections on the opposition between poetry and triviality as well as between ethics and triviality are penetrating. And as far as the two types of triviality converge, he has indeed pointed out a considerable field in which poetry and ethics can meet and be brought into a very fruitful dialogue.

But the question is whether his reflections entitle him to let poetry and ethics make common cause against triviality in this immediate way. Or put differently, is triviality the same as an aesthetic and an ethical category? Not necessarily, I should think. Or in one of Løgstrup's own favourite rhetorical figures: triviality and triviality might be two different things.

The overcoming of unaesthetic triviality does not automatically involve an overcoming of unethical triviality. Particularly not on the level of creation. The poet's commitment to the absolute demands of form might very well compel him into facing things in another and truer light and so overcoming his habitual thinking. But the very same commitment might at the same time be so occupying that beauty and cognition become an end in themselves, and the required ethical acts fail to appear. The unethical triviality - the complacent indifference - triumphs, exactly by means of the poetic overcoming of the unaesthetic triviality.

II.

In the latter half of the chapter Løgstrup takes as his point of departure a collection of essays on Poetry and Existence (Poesi og Eksistens, Copenhagen 1953) by the Danish poet Ole Wivel. Here Wivel dissociates himself partly from a categorical separation between poetry and ethics that turns poetry into a cynical aestheticism, partly from what we could call a distinct political-moral poetry. Instead he insists that the ethical understanding of life comes from within, from the poetic understanding of life.

The poetic understanding of life is to be understood as opposed to our normal relation to the world. Usually we define ourselves by defining things around us. In the case of poetry we do not define ourselves; we are being defined. Poetic openness does not disclose information because it involves a disclosure not of a certain number of isolated things, but of existence itself. And furthermore, this disclosure is all-inclusive, i.e., we ourselves are drawn into and identified with existence which reveals itself. Thus there is no opportunity for adopting a stance or attitude, and thereby placing ourselves in relationship with something tangible and comprehensible.
This poetic "identification" means that things are present in a more essential way than usually. So essential that it cannot be communicated in the normal sense of that term. It can come to expression only through rhythm and timbre, image and metaphor, i.e., symbolically.

Symbols are not peculiar to poetry. However, in poetry the symbol functions in a different way than normally. The poetic symbol has neither a semantic nor an expressive function. It does not denote objects to which we can relate ourselves, neither does it intend to mediate to us the poet’s subjective experiences and feelings with reference to our enrichment.

According to Løgstrup there is a third possibility, and here he claims to give expression to the poets’ own intention. Seen from the inside, the experience expressed by the symbol is not subjective. On the contrary, it is an experience through which the world—one is tempted to say the objective world—is brought closer than usually.

From the poet’s point of view the purpose of poetry is cognition rather than enrichment of the reader. Løgstrup refers to a statement by the Danish novelist Martin A. Hansen: 'Poetry must be used for something; it cannot be content only to aestheticize' (Leviathan, Copenhagen 1950, p. 49).

And the means to this use, to this cognition, is—according to Løgstrup—the identification, the nearness of poetic openness. When, by the way, Løgstrup as a rare exception quotes Martin A. Hansen, I feel it incumbent on me to point out a striking difference. According to Martin A. Hansen, artistic cognition is not brought about by means of identification and nearness. On the contrary. By keeping a distance, by getting things and people in perspective, the writer becomes capable of studying his surroundings like another parasite or voyeur. This is the reason why Martin A. Hansen evaluated much more negatively the relations between writing and ethics than did Løgstrup. The difference may be due to the fact that Martin A. Hansen was a novelist, and Løgstrup here speaks about the poet. But it might also originate in the fact that Martin A. Hansen was a writer.4

Anyway, Løgstrup’s point about the poetic identification leads him to the decisive question regarding the relationship between the poetic and the ethical outlook: What is to prevent poetic openness from becoming a personality-dissolving aesthetic infatuation? What constitutes the difference between the infatuated condition and poetic openness?

Løgstrup’s answer—and here I actually agree—is that the difference consists in the contradictions experienced in the act of commitment—the contradictions between experience and existence, both the poet’s and the reader’s. The poetic experience is contradicted by our own existence because the experience is only by glimpses and is too

4 Otherwise Løgstrup is remarkably silent as regards Martin A. Hansen’s works. Despite the fact that hardly any Danes—except perhaps for Søren Kierkegaard—have paid more attention to the relations between writing and ethics than the two of them, Løgstrup only refers to Martin A. Hansen this once. The silence is even more striking considering that the poets Thorkild Bjørnvig and Ole Wivel were close friends of both, that Løgstrup frequently deals with other writers of the period, and that Løgstrup’s library contains a considerable collection of (annotated) books by and about Martin A. Hansen. For an attempt at an explanation, cf. my article "Digerens janushoved" ('The Writer’s Janus Head"), Transfiguration. Nordic Journal of Christianity and the Arts, no. 2, Copenhagen 2001, pp. 55-76.
fleeting to be retained in the world of personal relationships. The constant temptation of
the poetic understanding of life is therefore to remain in the act of commitment without
letting life’s contradiction of experience become a part of the experience. A contradiction
that constitutes personality and so may become a demand upon our existence. By virtue of
this demand poetic experience does not necessarily become illusory by its being disputed
by existence. On the contrary, the contradiction might teach us how to live a better life.

THE LØGSTRUP ARCHIVE

The Løgstrup Archive comprises the works of the Danish theologian and philosopher K.E.
Løgstrup (1905-1981) and material related to these works. It is the archive’s aim to make its
collection available for research and to promote acquaintance with Løgstrup’s thinking.

The collection consists of Løgstrup’s published works (in Danish as well as in
translation), his posthumous manuscripts, secondary literature on Løgstrup’s thinking, the
major part of K.E. and Rosemarie Løgstrup’s book collection, biographical material and
video tapes (interview and Løgstrup’s last lecture). It is possible to study the collection at
the archive, the Faculty of Theology, University of Aarhus. There is no loan service, but
material you may wish to obtain can be photocopied at a very reasonable cost.

Løgstrup’s posthumous manuscripts are stored on microfilm. The archive has an
electronic database, which makes it possible to search for manuscripts that contain specific
keywords, names, or combinations of the two. This database is accessible via the internet
address http://www.teo.au.dk/accbaser/logstrup/Logstrup.asp. The manuscripts can be read by
means of a scanner placed at the archive. It is possible to digitalize manuscripts (or
selected pages) and store and forward them as electronic files. It is also possible, for
payment, to have the digitalized version of a manuscript sent to you.

For more information about the Løgstrup Archive, please consult our website:
http://www.loegstrup.au.dk. Queries can be addressed to: Kees van Kooten Niekerk, the
head of the archive (address: see above).

RE-OPENING OF THE LØGSTRUP ARCHIVE

On 5 October 2001, the Løgstrup Archive was officially opened. Actually, it was a ‘re-
opening’ as the archive had existed before. But there were several reasons for celebrating
the event. The Faculty of Theology, which houses the archive, has moved into new
buildings and thus has more space for the archive. Also, thanks to a generous donation
from the Velux Foundation, the archive has been provided with up-to-date equipment and
now presents itself as a both functional and esthetical setting for scholarly work.

The event was opened by Professor Peter Widmann, Dean of the Faculty of
Theology. In his speech, Widmann emphasized the importance of Løgstrup in the history
of the faculty and appreciated the improved facilities for research in Løgstrup. Professor
Svend Andersen, chairman of the Board of the Løgstrup Archive, pointed to the fact that
with the new localisation, Løgstrup’s works have been moved out of ‘the shadow of
Grundtvig’ (N.F.S. Grundtvig, the great 19th century Danish theologian and poet, has a
research centre at faculty, and until the move of the faculty, the Løgstrup Archive was placed in a corner of the Centre for Grundtvig Studies). Both speakers directed words of thank to Anne-Margrete Ogstrup-Pedersen, who represented the Velux Foundation.

Among the invited guests was Rosemarie Løgstrup, in company with her and Knud Løgstrup’s two oldest children. In a lively way she shared experiences of a long life in Denmark as a German.

As a university teacher, Løgstrup always, at the end of the semester, invited the participants of his lectures home for dinner. These gatherings were characterized by an open and friendly atmosphere.

The opening of the archive took place in the same atmosphere as that of these ‘good old days’.

Svend Andersen

WORKSHOP ABOUT LØGSTRP’S ETHICS

From 8 to 12 May 2002, the Løgstrup Archive organized an international workshop entitled The Significance of K.E. Løgstrup’s Ethics. This workshop was held at the Sandbjerg Estate in the South of Jutland, Denmark, which is the conference centre of the University of Aarhus. It consists of a complex of well-restored buildings beautifully situated among green hills and blue waters. The buildings and the landscape made an attractive setting, the charm of which was enhanced by an almost unceasing sunshine.

The workshop was a so-called expert workshop for invited people. Its subject was the significance of Løgstrup’s ethics for the international ethical debate. The 29 participants came from 7 different countries. Four prominent scholars from abroad, Brenda Almond, Zygmunt Bauman, Alasdair Maclntyre and Hans Reinders, contributed with papers. These papers had been sent to the participants in advance together with background articles by Svend Andersen and Kees van Kooten Niekerk as well as English translations of three extracts from Løgstrup’s ethical writings after The Ethical Demand.

The core of the workshop was the presentation of the papers, invited comments and subsequent discussion. Unfortunately, Zygmunt Bauman was not able to attend. But he was generously replaced by Hans Fink, who commented on Bauman’s paper and presented his own interpretation of Løgstrup’s ethics. Two evenings were set aside for the reading, in minor groups, of capitula selecta from Løgstrup’s ethics. But there was also time for an excursion to the historical centre Dybbøl Banke, which tells the story of the Danish
war against Prussia and Austria in 1864. Saturday afternoon Rosemarie Løgstrup, K.E. Løgstrup’s widow, told about her husband’s and her own experiences in connection with the Second World War. The workshop concluded with a festive dinner seasoned with speeches, recitations and songs.

In her paper, Brenda Almond compared Løgstrup’s ethics with the English moral philosophy in the mid twentieth century. She drew attention to some points of contact. But she did not deny the obvious contrast between Løgstrup’s resorting to human experience, spontaneity and intuition and the emphasis on duties and principles in English moral philosophy. She characterized the latter as ‘somewhat arid’ and expressed much sympathy with the emphasis on trust and dependency in Løgstrup’s ethics. At the same time, however, she insisted on the indispensability of moral rights, duties and principles.

In his paper, Zygmunt Bauman pointed out that Løgstrup’s idea that we normally trust one another is at odds with young people’s experience in our time. The media tell us that life is a competition in which you should trust no one, personal relations tend to depend on mutual satisfaction, and the official counsellors advise more self-concern. Trust is doomed to frustration. However, according to Bauman, this does not invalidate Løgstrup’s conviction that we must invest our hope of morality in the pre-reflexive spontaneity of which trust is a part. The paper’s other main subject was our time’s extension of human interdependence from proximate relations to the whole globe. In this connection Bauman discussed the difficult problem how to live up to our responsibility for humanity as a whole.

Hans Fink gave an account of what he regarded as the valid philosophical core of The Ethical Demand - apart from Løgstrup’s theological presuppositions. First and foremost he pointed to Løgstrup’s analysis of trust as a part of the human condition, which reveals both the vulnerability and the interdependence of human life with their implication of the ethical demand. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of Løgstrup’s distinction between the ethical sphere and social morality, the former being the sphere of personal relationships, the latter that of social regulation of human life. Finally, arguing that life has to be lived in both spheres, he criticized Bauman’s looking for hope only in the ethical sphere of personal responsibility and trust.

Alasdair MacIntyre addressed the question what a Thomist should learn from Løgstrup. His general answer was that a Thomistic ethic has much to learn from Løgstrup’s phenomenology. First, he concretized this answer with regard to trust: Løgstrup’s analysis of the ‘natural’ primacy of trust in children should be integrated into a Thomistic account of the development of trust into mature trust. Second, he appreciated Løgstrup’s pointing to the role of spontaneity in human life. But he criticized him for opposing it to duty. From a Thomistic point of view, the virtuous person has precisely learned to act spontaneously from duty for the sake of the other. Finally, MacIntyre advocated integration of Løgstrup’s idea of the ethical demand into a Thomistic ethic. But this integration should not comprise the notion that the demand is unfulfillable, because this notion is contradictory and relies on a false contrast between spontaneity and duty.

In his paper, Hans Reinders defended the thesis that Løgstrup’s conception of the ethical demand is essentially dependent on the idea that life is a gift. He stressed that, in Løgstrup’s view, this gift is not merely a datum but a donum in the theological sense of a gift given by God. In this connection he discussed Bauman’s criticism that Løgstrup’s notion of the gift makes responding to the demand dependent on the logic of exchange,
which contradicts the unconditionality of moral responsibility. Reinders rejected this criticism with the argument that it is only valid on the assumption that gifts always presuppose the logic of exchange. But, according to him, it can be argued that God’s giving excessively and out of grace transcends this logic. In his oral presentation, Reinders touched on the sovereign expressions of life, which he characterized as embodiments of the gift of life from God.

One of the principal subjects of the discussion was the question, provoked by the different positions of Fink and Reinders, whether Løgstrup’s ethics is philosophically convincing or only acceptable on theological presuppositions. Another important subject was the question of the reach of phenomenology. Is, for example, the notion that life is a gift (donum) implied in a phenomenological description of the experience of gratitude, or does it involve a religious or theological interpretation that transcends such a description? Obviously, these two subjects are connected insofar as a view of the reach of phenomenology affects the question whether Løgstrup’s ethics can be considered as philosophically plausible. There was a general agreement that these are among the subjects that deserve further research.

At the workshop it was decided that the papers, the comments and the background articles will be published. Furthermore, the translated extracts from Løgstrup’s later ethical writings will, supplemented with other extracts, be published in a separate volume. These publications are expected to appear in the course of 2003.

Kees van Kooten Niekerk

**BRIEF NOTES**

Thanks to a donation by Mrs. Rosemarie Løgstrup, K.E. Løgstrup’s widow, the Løgstrup Archive has acquired the part of Rosemarie and K.E. Løgstrup’s book collection that is significant for research. The donation includes about 1,080 titles of non-fiction (especially theology and philosophy) and about 480 titles of fiction, literary history and history of art. These titles are now being registered and we expect to have finished the registration in October 2002. Information about the books will be added to the existing database on Logstrup’s posthumous manuscripts and will thus become accessible via the internet address: [http://www.teo.au.dk/acchaser/logstrup/Logstrup.asp](http://www.teo.au.dk/acchaser/logstrup/Logstrup.asp).
In 1979, Danmarks Radio (the Danish Broadcasting Corporation) transmitted five interviews with K.E. Løgstrup. These interviews were published in 1984 under the title *Det uomtvistelige* (‘The incontrovertible’). The interviewer was Helmut Friis, a journalist at Danmarks Radio. After his death, the recordings and correspondence with Løgstrup was given to Peter Holm, now dean in Frederiksberg. Peter Holm has generously donated this material to the Løgstrup Archive. The material will be made accessible for research in due time.

In April 2001, a seminar on the modern Løgstrup-reception was held at the Faculty of Theology, the University of Copenhagen. At this seminar six researchers from Norway and Denmark (Arne Grøn, Kees van Kooten Niekerk, Anders Lindseth, Jakob Wolf, Svend Andersen and Jan-Olav Henriksen) presented their papers on aspects of Løgstrup’s thought. As an introduction to the plenary discussion, six other researchers commented on these papers. In May 2002, papers, comments, and replies to the comments were published in the book: *Spor i Sandet. Bidrag til forståelse af K.E. Løgstrups forfatterskab* (‘Traces in the Sand. Contributions to the understanding of K.E. Løgstrup’s works’, edited by Jakob Wolf and Mickey Gjerris, Copenhagen: ANIS). This book will be reviewed in the next issue of this newsletter.

In the spring semester of 2003, senior lecturer, Dr. Phil. Hans Hauge will teach a graduate seminar on K.E. Løgstrup’s aesthetics and philosophy of language, at the Department of Nordic Language and Literature, University of Aarhus. In addition to Løgstrup’s own texts, the seminar will include readings of some of the Danish writers who Løgstrup critiqued and defended, e.g., Per Højholt, T. Bjørnvig, and it will discuss his interventions in the cultural debates of his time. Reference will also be made to Løgstrup’s new metaphysics. The seminar will be conducted in Danish. For further information, see the Department's website: www.hum.au.dk/nordisk/lokal.