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EDITORIAL

This second issue of the Newsletter opens with an article by Ole Jensen on the relationship between phenomenology and religious understanding in Løgstrup’s work. Jensen is one of Løgstrup’s most distinguished disciples and is especially well-known for his work on the ecological problem. His article touches on the question whether the idea that life is a gift is accessible to phenomenology or can only be the result of a special religious interpretation – a question that was discussed vividly at last year’s workshop held at the Sandbjerg Estate. Actually, Jensen’s article is an elaboration of his contribution to that discussion. It defends the thesis that a religious understanding of life is involved in some phenomenological descriptions and does not require a religious interpretation that transcends such descriptions. Interestingly, this thesis is put forward against Skabelse og Tilintetgørelse (Creation and Annihilation, 1978), where Løgstrup distinguishes between phenomenological description, metaphysical implication and religious interpretation. Jensen’s article thus continues the Sandbjerg discussion of Løgstrup’s phenomenology and may evoke new contributions.
This issue of the Newsletter also contains two reviews of books on aspects of Løgstrup’s thought. The first review concerns Jakob Wolf and Mickey Gjerris (eds.): *Spor i sandet. Bidrag til forståelse af K.E. Løgstrups forfatterskab* (Trace(s) in the Sand. Contributions to the Understanding of K.E. Løgstrup’s Work). This book contains six contributions to a conference on the reception of Løgstrup in Scandinavia held in Copenhagen in April 2001, each followed by the comment given there and the author’s reply. It is reviewed by the literary scholar Hans Hauge, who in 1992 acquired the higher doctoral degree on his dissertation *K.E. Løgstrup. En moderne profet* (K.E. Løgstrup. A Modern Prophet). The second review concerns Hans Henningsen: *Tilværelsesophlysning. Et grundtema hos K.E. Løgstrup* (Enlightenment of Existence. A Basic Theme in K.E. Løgstrup), which deals with Løgstrup’s pedagogical ideas in the context of his thinking as a whole. This book is reviewed by Tone Sævi, who is working on a thesis about pedagogy and phenomenology.

On 11 April Rosemarie and K.E. Løgstrup’s book collection was inaugurated with a reception for the Løgstrup family and people connected to the Løgstrup Archive. The collection had been catalogued and entered into an on-line database by Christian Koch Ramsing, student of religion and employee at the State and University Library in Aarhus. At the inauguration Ramsing delivered a speech in which he explained how the catalogue was made and told about the fascinating discoveries he made during the work. Since this speech may be of a wider interest, it appears here in print.

Let me conclude by inviting you kindly to send me contributions and information suitable to be published in this newsletter. And, of course, I will be glad to receive any kind of feedback.

Kees van Kooten Niekerk
The Ethical Demand page 123 and the Problem of Natural Theology

by Professor Ole Jensen, dr. theol.

The participants of the international workshop on The Significance of K. E. Løgstrup’s Ethics held at The Sandbjerg Estate in Southern Jutland on 8-12 May 2002 discussed the interpretation of page 123 in Løgstrup’s The Ethical Demand, the revised English translation (1997) of Den etiske fordring (1956). According to Løgstrup, the ethical demand consists of two components:

(i) “It receives its content”, the care for the other person, from “a fact”, which can be “demonstrated empirically”: the interdependence of the personal life.

(ii) “It receives its one-sidedness from the understanding that a person’s life is an ongoing gift”.

About this second component the text continues with the statement: “That life has been given to us is something that cannot be demonstrated empirically; it can only be accepted in faith – or else denied” (my italics).

The words in italics refer to two points where a more specific translation would have been of importance to the discussion.

The first translation problem is the word “given”. The Danish word “givet” is equivalent of the English “given”, and the words are ambiguous in both languages. The term used in the original Danish text, however, is not “givet”, but “skænket”, which means “given (as a gift)”. And since it refers back to “a person’s life is an ongoing gift” (my italics), it should be obvious – also to the reader of the English translation – that “given” in this context means “skænket”/”given (as a gift)”; what is more, it says: “given to us” (my italics). Anyway, the discussions at the workshop showed that the passage is open to misunderstandings. These misunderstandings could have been avoided by translating it as: “given to us as a gift”, or: “that life is a gift”, as done by Rosemarie Løgstrup in her German translation: “dass das Leben ein Geschenk ist”². However that may be, Løgstrup speaks unambiguously about life being a gift (donum) and not just about a givenness of life (datum) “in the ordinary philosophical sense of being prior to and a precondition of all we may think and do”³.

This, however, provokes the question: Does that mean that Løgstrup, as far as this second component is concerned, gives up his pretension of arguing purely philosophically? It will be remembered that Løgstrup, on the first page of the book, declared it to be “the attempt to give a definition in strictly human terms of the relationship to the other person which is contained in the religious proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth” (my italics)⁴. Did Løgstrup take a step from philosophy to theology when referring to life being a gift⁵?

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¹ The Ethical Demand, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre/Hans Fink, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame Indiana 1997; Den etiske fordring, Gyldendal, Copenhagen 1956.
² Die ethische Forderung, H. Laupp’sche Buchhandlung, Tübingen 1959, p.137.
³ MacIntyre/Fink’s Introduction to The Ethical Demand p. xxxv.
⁴ The Ethical Demand p. 1.
⁵ As presumed by Hans Reiners in his workshop paper, Donum or datum?
This question takes us to the second translation problem, the term “faith”. The Danish text uses a verb in the infinitive form, not a noun: “… er ikke til at konstatere empirisk, kun til at tro eller benægte”, which means in a direct – and inelegant – translation: “…cannot be demonstrated empirically; it is only to believe or deny”. The Danish verb “tro” means more or less the same as the English verb “believe” as it covers the non-religious meanings “I presume / take it / assume / trust” as well as the direct religious meaning “I believe in…God/the forgiveness of sins/Christ etc.” and various other meanings in between. The term “faith”, however, has overt religious connotations. And that this is what is meant in Løgstrup’s text might surely seem to be obvious as our author is a theologian. However, this makes it all the more unfortunate.

Non-Danish speakers will not know that Løgstrup – as mentioned in Jakob Wolf’s workshop paper, Respons to Hans Reinders⁶ – in his book Kunst og etik (Art and Ethics) from 1961 unambiguously rejected this as a misunderstanding. He distinguishes between “the human” and “the specifically Christian” (sc. in Christianity)⁷. “The specifically Christian” is, in the proclamation of Jesus, “that which is unforeseen in it”, the forgiveness of sins out of pure grace and Jesus’ implicit self-identification with God⁸. “By contrast, the acknowledgment that the ethical demand is radical and one-sided in an understanding, experience, or interpretation of, or a belief in (or whatever else one might choose to call it) our life as something given to us as a gift belongs to the human sphere. If one calls it ‘belief’, it is not a specifically Christian belief, but a human one. If one calls it ‘religiousness’, it is not a specifically Christian religiousness, but a human one” (my italics). What is meant on p. 123 is therefore not Christian “faith” in the specific sense.

At the same place in Kunst og etik, Løgstrup admits that the demand’s “understanding of life” (ii) is not “phenomenologically worked out” in The Ethical Demand, as is the case with its “content” (i); it is claimed as a mere assertion. Otherwise, he explains, “another decade would have passed before I could have published my book. The reason is that the phenomenological analyses required to do so are of quite a different kind”.

Løgstrup also admits that the term “human” is ambiguous, and does not use it any more in his authorship. Instead he talks about the difference between “that which is universal (in Christianity)”, including the idea of creation and the ethical demand, and “that which is specifically Christian (in Christianity)”, including “Jesus’ (and the congregation’s) proclamation of the Kingdom of God”, where the difference is exactly that the content of the former is accessible to all humans and thus can be the subject of a phenomenological treatment and philosophical investigation, whereas this does not apply to the content of the latter, which are truths of proclamation to be believed (in Christian faith) or rejected.⁹

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⁶ As the Workshop Papers will not be published until later this year, I feel compelled to repeat some of Jakob Wolf’s information.
⁸ Corresponding to The Ethical Demand ch. 12.
We can therefore conclude that also as far as “the understanding of life” as a gift is concerned, it is Løgstrup’s pretension to argue purely philosophically, no matter how much he may call it a “belief” besides “understanding, experience, interpretation”. It could be said that “another decade” should pass for “the attempt to give a definition in strictly human terms of the understanding of life which is contained within the religious proclamation of Jesus”, that is, the understanding of creation and preservation contained in the proclamation of Jesus, cf. Matthew 5:45b; – corresponding to the decade that had been used for the preparation “in strictly human terms” of The Ethical Demand’s analyses of love of one’s neighbour, i.e. the understanding of law in the proclamation of Jesus – see Matthew 5:44! The relationship in this passage of the Sermon on the Mount between the demand on the one hand and the understanding of life inherent in the ideas of creation and preservation on the other corresponds to the relationship on p. 123 between the two components of the demand.

No doubt Jakob Wolf is on the right track when he refers to Løgstrup’s late work Metafysik I-IV (1976–1984) as the fulfilment of what Løgstrup might have had in mind when saying that the missing phenomenological analyses are “of quite a different kind”. This is obvious, although it is also remarkable that Løgstrup never even hinted that this was the case. We may, however, point out with perfect justice that the two milestones of Løgstrup’s life work, The Ethical Demand and the Metaphysics volumes (partly anticipated with the analyses of “the sovereign expressions of life”) together constitute a description of the ethics and “ontology”11, integrated in each other in Matthew 5:44-45! To push it to extremes: from this point of view, Løgstrup’s life work concentrates on an allegedly ‘universally’ valid and obliging, demythologized interpretation of the ethics and “the

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11 The Ethical Demand n. 2 p. 171. Løgstrup also writes in 1956: “...where the Catholic theology has an ontology, the Protestant theology, according to the existential theologian, must have an empty space...”; contrary to this Løgstrup claims that “faith implies an ontology”, Ekistensteologien og dens skelnen mellem tro og verdensanskuelse (Existential Theology and Its Distinguishing Between Faith and World View), in: Acta Societatis Theologicae Uppsalensis 1951-1955, Uppsala 1956, p. 45, 54; cf. Løgstrups statement discussing with Heidegger on the Tagung ‘alter Marburger’ in Jugenheim Okt. 1958: “Die evangelische Theologie kann da, wo die katholische Theologie eine Philosophie hat, kein Vakuum lassen”, Protokoll der Tagung in 1959 p. 26, in: Protokolle der Tagungen ‘Alter Marburger’ 1949-1962, hrsg. E.Dinkler; and cf. Løgstrup’s pleading for an “ontologic ethics” in Ethik und Ontologie; ZThK 57/1960 (printed as an appendix in The Ethical Demand). – According to the annual reports of the University of Aarhus, Løgstrup lectured on Luther’s social-ethical writings in 1950-51 and in 1954-55 – as well as in 1958, when I attended myself and where he put great emphasis on the concluding words of Von weltlicher Obrigkeit on lex naturae as the demand for love; in the spring of 1960 he held a seminar on “The Problem of Natural Theology”. In Ekistensteologien... he claims that “God’s omnipresence (in Luther) is ontology”, and that “we understand it by our common sense”, and he obviously seems to share this view, p. 47; in 1962 he also expresses his own view when writing in the Vindrose article p. 526: “according to the Jewish-Christian belief, it is beyond human powers to know and meet God in this world. On the other hand, it is not beyond human powers to know that the world belongs to God.”
philosophy of creation” (the expression that Løgstrup ends up preferring12) contained in the Sermon on the Mount.13

As it will appear from the following paragraphs, the “philosophy of creation” in Løgstrup’s late authorship, just like the “demand’s understanding of life” in 1956/1961, contains an element of “belief”, which is included in the philosophical understanding (in the “universal”, in contradistinction to that which is specifically Christian). Løgstrup’s work, considered as a whole, can therefore latest from 1956 onwards be characterized as “the return of religion in philosophy”14.

There is no doubt that Løgstrup here deliberately dissociates himself from Kierkegaard and existential theology15. It is therefore surprising and confusing that, at the same time (p. 123, second paragraph), he operates with the apparently existential theological contrast between “demonstrate empirically” and “believe or deny” in an existential decision. Certainly, it should be noted that he has pushed the contrast from being a contrast between universal truths and the decision of Christian faith, as it would have been according to existential theology, to being a contrast within the universal sphere – between what is demonstrable and what demands a (“human”) belief decision.

If, however, we look at the Metaphysics volumes, we see an astonishing consistency at that point, which cannot be accidental.16 Despite his dissociation, Løgstrup all the time deliberately preserves an existential-theological element. It is true that Protestant theology cannot have an empty space where Catholic theology has an ontology (see note 11). Understanding and philosophy are there to prevent “fideism” and “obscurantism” (Kierkegaard and existential theology). The empty space, however, certainly must not be filled in with a “rational theology” in the proper sense of the word, “which Kierkegaard correctly dismissed because it put itself in the place of the Christian message and pretended to be both demonstrable and free of contradictions”. The reason why – Løgstrup continues, exactly as we saw it in 1956/1961 – there “is talk of belief in not only a Christian but also a philosophical-religious sense” (my italics), is that already at this point, before that which is specifically Christian, “demonstration is precluded” in the final analysis; the step to the philosophical-religious belief, like the step to the specifically Christian belief is made “with our existence”, in “decision”. On the other hand, it is not arbitrary or excluded from testing, even though it is a special kind of testing.

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12 E.g. *Metaphysics* Vol. I p. 60 (IV 65 – the passage in the Danish version is shown in brackets); *Metafysik III* p. 166f.; not included in the English version.
13 In 1938, when Løgstrup was a pastor, he writes a fine small article on Matth 5:44-45, from the viewpoint of phenomenology, in the church newsletter, which can be said to contain the complete following authorship in nuce, *Elsk Jeres Fjender!* (Love Your Enemies!), in: Kirkeblad for Sandager-Holevad 1938/9. Even the ‘attuned sensation’ appears in the article.
15 He discusses this in a number of works from approx. 1948 until and including *Opgør med Kierkegaard* (Controverting Kierkegaard), Gyldendal, Copenhagen 1968. On his relation to existential theology, see my Theologie zwischen Illusion und Restriktion. Analyse und Kritik der existens-kritizistischen Theologie bei dem jungen Wilhelm Herrman und bei Rudolf Bultmann, Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologi, Bd.71, Chr. Kaiser Verlag, München 1975, p. 186f. and 215ff.
16 In the following I refer to *Metaphysics* Vol. I p. 315 and p. 251f. (IV 263 and 212ff.)
Løgstrup is balancing on a razor’s edge between rational theology and existential theology, between “the leap” (Kierkegaard) and the proof of God’s existence, between pre-critical “innocence” and post-Kantian renunciation of religious knowledge, the whole time probably resorting to the religious ontology of Luther’s writings on the Lord’s Supper. The means is a phenomenological metaphysics and the concept of “religious interpretation”. The concept “interpretation” (Danish “tydning”), which in 1961 was equivalent of the “human belief”, plays an increasing role in the rest of the authorship, specified as “religious interpretation” or “religious overall interpretation”. It is exactly the religious interpretation, which – as in 1961 – implies belief “in a philosophical-religious sense”.

The balancing act concludes in a subtle three-step construction. I will exemplify this – as Løgstrup himself did very clearly – by “the sovereign expressions of life”, but the argumentation applies equally to a number of other phenomena, e.g. colour and type.\(^\text{17}\)

(i) **(Phenomenology:)** The sovereign expressions of life are “unconditional” – if mercy or trust are to serve purposes different from their own, we have invalidated them. And they are simultaneously “anonymous and personal” – they keep pushing their way through, even though we repeatedly exploit and spoil them in coldness and mistrust. This is the reasons why they are called “sovereign”. These characteristics are inherent “in their concrete, empirical, ascertainable nature”.

(ii) **(Metaphysics:)** And this is an inexplicable, but incontestable “metaphysical trait” of them. It appears from “an inference from the empirical to the metaphysical” (nota bene: from the *phenomenological*-empirical) “in an analytical judgment”. “We bridle at this notion. Instinctively we have the preconception that we take a leap when we move from the empirical to the metaphysical”\(^\text{18}\). But that is a prejudice of modern philosophy of science, as shown by, a.o. W.W.Bartley III.

(iii) **(Religion:)** But the metaphysical trait does not keep quiet; the inexplicable is in need of an explanation. It points beyond itself, it “suggests a religious interpretation” – Danish: “lægger en religiøs tydning nær”\(^\text{19}\). But when we step over to the religious interpretation, “we proceed synthetically”, not analytically. The metaphysical questioning cannot be “answered” within the framework of the question. “The inference from metaphysics to religion has the character of a synthesis, the imagination takes an active role in symbolic creation”. This, however, does not mean an arbitrary fideistic “leap”; that the inference is rooted in the phenomenon protects it from this: “it is the phenomenon itself that suggests an overstepping of the area”. Therefore it is possible to make a “verification”, a so-

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17 In the following I refer to *Metaphysics* Vol I pp. 81f., 89ff. and 241-54 (IV pp. 82f., 88ff. and 205-215); cf. *Metafysik III* (no English version) p. 162 on the “ordeal by fire”.

18 My translation. In my view, the last sentence on the page, *Metaphysics* Vol I p. 246 (IV 210) has been wrongly translated.

19 Another possible translation of this frequently occurring expression is Fink/MacIntyre’s “invites a religious interpretation” in *Introduction to The Ethical Demand*. 
called “dispensability test” ("undværlighedsprøve")20: “we ask what we lose in our immediate experience and what metaphysical questions we must give up if we lose the comprehensive religious interpretation”. This does not make the step compelling, though (that would be an attempted proof of God’s existence); the interpretation “demands to be accepted voluntarily”, because belief from a (Neo-)Protestant view excludes a *sacrificium intellectus*, and therefore “the phenomenon can always be interpreted irreligiously”.

In other terms, *Metaphysics* is what we cannot escape (the analytical judgment), but also what we cannot explain. We are therefore left with a need for an explanation, which is met by *religion*, i.e. obviously met on other conditions than those of common explanation (the synthetic judgment); its “answers” are “self-suggesting” (Danish “næriligende”) but not coercive, neither unavoidable nor arbitrary.

According to Wolf, this is Løgstrup’s late, authoritative interpretation of what is to be understood by the second component in the ethical demand on p. 123.

As far as I am concerned, however, I cannot help considering this “upward-”going three-step construction as an embarrassment solution. The determinations are constantly negations to either side, i.e. re-active, neither/nor determinations, possibly too much influenced by the idea that they controvert: an irreligious ontology disguised as philosophy of science or existentialism. A relaxation in the philosophy of science may have occurred later, in the period referred to by some scholars as the “post-secular” period, in which a justification confronting this idea is no longer so imperative.

At least, it appears to me that, in connection with certain phenomena and situations, the religious is an inescapable religious constituent of the phenomenon’s very phenomenological nature and not due to be expressed in an interpretation attached in a new act. The experience, and thus the implicit understanding in the experience, is religious, even though it is not always recognized as being religious; it is implicit or anonymously religious and, the phenomenological description of it must therefore, to be adequate, also include the religious component21. – Løgstrup himself is very close to asserting something similar when saying, for example, about our involuntary conviction that the world is coloured in spite of the intracranialist theory, and that life has meaning in spite of the theory of evolution, that: “We can do no other than live in a religious conviction, only its religiosity has gone underground in an age of irreligiosity”22.

I am thinking of the examples mentioned by Alasdair MacIntyre: “Kathrine Mansfield described in one of her letters a surge of gratitude for her existence without being able to say to whom she was grateful”; and I am thinking of Jakob Wolf’s reference to a famous passage in the religious-critical Danish author Henrik Pontoppidan’s memoirs that we live on life’s “undeserved gifts of love” and leave this life as “insolvent debtors”;23 and I am thinking of the words said by the Danish poet Jørgen-Frantz Jacobsen shortly before his death after having been ravaged by tuberculosis for 17 years: “I remain deeply

20 Løgstrup obviously owes this idea to Joachim Ritter, to whom he refers in *Metaphysics* Vol. I p. 102 (IV p. 98).
21 See my *Sårbar usårlighed* p. 88.
23 In their contributions to the *Workshop Papers*. 
grateful to life and continue to reconcile myself to its conditions, for it gives more than it takes, and I have already received so much that I will never get a justified reason to complain.”

However, I am also thinking of some of Løgstrup’s own examples and references. I think, for example, of his interpretation of Jørgen Nielsen’s short story in *Metafysik IV*, in which “the life of another person ... rises up in its sacrosanctity” (Danish: “i dets urørlighed”, “its untouchableness”) and prevents the main character from implementing his plan to kill his wife – which is not an attached religious interpretation, though, but a description of his experience and the self-understanding inherent in it. The religious must be said to be the point of the situation’s phenomenal nature, without which the phenomenological description would have been far from complete. As Jørgen Nielsen puts it, “he had gone beyond the limits of a human being”; “unknown powers had crushed him”. And I am thinking in general of the passages where Løgstrup discusses phenomena like modesty (blufærdighed), inviolability (urørlighed) and shamelessness.

The last concept is crucial of his ethical considerations concerning both humans and nature: not just in our relationship to humans, but “also in our relationship to nature and the universe, there is an exercise of power in which there is a shamelessness”27. “Shame and shyness, respect [better: ‘reverence’, OJ] and recognition, bashfulness and modesty and more” (Danish: “skam og skyhed, agtelse og anerkendelse, undselse og blufærdighed og mere til”) are, according to Løgstrup, “variations” of the impulse of “restraint” (“tilbageholdenhed”), which has been given to man with the attuned (“stemte”), distanceless sensation. What makes reverence into reverence is that which claims reverence or evokes it by being worth the reverence so that it cannot be escaped. It is the same thing that appears, only threatening, in Jørgen Nielsen’s short story – as inviolable and awe-inspiring – from the viewpoint of the phenomenology of religion: as tabu. It is an experienced halt, a confrontation with an unfathomable beyond. But this experience of what claims recognition in reverence and awe is, in my opinion, religion’s – often anonymous, unreflective, unrecognized – beginning in an unbroken continuity with the experience of the phenomenon; there is no breaking off to turn to something different, a religious interpretation. The religious element belongs integrally to the description of the phenomenon by being an integrated part of the phenomenon’s very phenomenal nature. The phenomenological account is not complete unless the religious element has been registered. It is part of the phenomenological “empiricism” and not something added in a new interpreting act.

This applies to a number of phenomena, which, by their very phenomenal nature, could be said to resist secularisation.

24 *Det dyrebare liv* (The Precious Life), Gyldendal, Copenhagen 1958, p. 106.
25 I do not hesitate to make that claim, in spite of the fact that the context in which Løgstrup uses the example is an explanation of what I have called his construction. Cf. *Metaphysics* Vol. I p. 82-85 (IV p. 83-85); the explanation was first printed in the article in *Vindrosen* 1962.
26 For example his essays “Blufærdighed” (Modesty) and “Formløshedens tyranni” (The Tyranny of Shapelessness) in *Kunst og etik, Urørlighedszonen* (The Zone of Inviolability) in *System og symbol. Essays*, Gyldendal, Copenhagen 1982 and the Gyllensten analysis in *Metaphysics* Vol. II p. 46ff. (III p. 50ff.).
In my view, Løgstrup’s entire authorship traces phenomena of this kind, from his early preoccupation with “life itself”²⁹ until the definitive settlement (in Metaphysics) with the philosophy of consciousness in the shapes of nominalism and transcendentalism (“the singular universal” and “the distanceless sensation”).

The question is how “different” the phenomenological analyses of the understanding of life as a gift are. Could we refrain from considering life worth living? In my opinion, the answer is “no” – it is a basic assumption that we always already have made, and it is a religious assumption, it is a fundamental belief inherent in the phenomenon.

BOOK REVIEW


by Hans Hauge, Associate Professor, dr.phil., Department of Scandinavian Languages and Literature, University of Aarhus.

In April 2001 the Department of Systematic Theology in Copenhagen University hosted a conference on the “modern” reception of Løgstrup, by which the organisers probably meant ‘contemporary’. Trace(s) in the Sand: Contributions to the Understanding of K. E. Løgstrup’s Work is the title of an anthology containing the contributions given as conference papers by a number of Danish and Norwegian theologians participating at the conference. Eleven men and one token woman.

Already the foreword betrays a certain anxiety. Does Løgstrup’s thinking belong to the past? The editors of the volume seem to be convinced of his not being relevant in the present. Their hope, therefore, is that eventually some day in the future he might again become topical. Taken seriously, they argue, Løgstrup’s thoughts would mean a significant change in the contemporary philosophical discussion. Well, perhaps. And do they mean in the world at large?

One wonders why the conference organisers then did not invite philosophers to contribute. Perhaps the absence of philosophers is one of the signs of decline in interest in Løgstrup. On the philosophical stock market it is Kierkegaard who is popular. No wonder. We are seeing a revival of existentialism as well as of neo-positivism – two of the philosophies Løgstrup critiqued.

I certainly agree that Løgstrup has things to contribute to contemporary theoretical discussions. In France the minister of education, Luc Ferry, is a neo-Kantian philosopher and a comparison with his philosophy of religion and Løgstrup’s anti-neo-Kantian one would be highly illuminating as would a confrontation between Løgstrup’s monism and vitalism with the at present so popular vitalist, Spinozist (non-)philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. The anthology does not do so – on the whole it fails to confront Løgstrup’s

²⁹ In the 1930s, culminating in his doctoral dissertation, Den erkendelsessteoretiske konflikt mellem den transcendentalfilosofiske idealisme og teologien (The Epistemological Conflict between Transcendental Idealism and Theology), Samlerens forlag, Copenhagen 1942. – Please also note Viggo Mortensen’s term “a sovereign hope”, which Løgstrup agrees with in Metaphysics Vol. I p. 295 (IV p. 247).
thinking with contemporary philosophy. Nevertheless it is a valuable book. It does offer new insights on Løgstrup’s texts. But it is for Logstrup specialists.

Most of the contributions defend Logstrup’s work. A few of them are mildly critical. One of the contributions, however, stands out: Svend Andersen’s. His is a sustained critique of all the basic Løgstrup concepts. I shall return to it below. If he is right, Løgstrup is history.

The anthology is organised in the following way: first a fairly long paper; then a response and finally a response to the response. Most of the papers take up the issue of the status of metaphysics, that is to say Logstrup’s so-called descriptive metaphysics, which, as Jacob Wolf argues convincingly, is pretty much the same as phenomenology. Yet obviously not everyone is either a metaphysician or a phenomenologist. The ensuing question then becomes: can metaphysics, as Løgstrup practised it, be defended?

Jacob Wolf’s contribution, “What Is Phenomenology?” I liked the best. It is a whole-hearted defence of Logstrup. It also gives a clue to what the title means. The trace in the sand is God. Eternity and time do not only become one in Christ but in every phenomenon. Phenomenology becomes in Wolf’s hands a kind of natural theology – Deus sive natura. Wolf brings out clearly how phenomenology is a philosophy of the surface. It does not have the desire to penetrate the surface and find something true behind it. Things are what they appear to be. Therefore God cannot be hidden in another world behind the visible one. There are traces of Him in the sand.

Arne Grøn’s position is the diametrically opposite of Wolf’s. Gøn is a traditional Kierkgaardian and will not give up subject-philosophy. He is unwilling to operate with something like Løgstrup’s concept of ‘sovereign life utterances’. Sovereignty or spontaneity is for him the subject’s contribution. Grøn’s paper summarises Logstrup’s ideas from the 1950’s (The Ethical Demand) and onwards. Grøn cannot follow him in going behind subjectivity and of making subjectivity secondary (p. 20). He cannot accept another subject – life - behind the subject and he concludes that the subject in a Kierkegaardian fashion has to take over the life utterance and make it its own. What does that mean? Asks Niels Grønkjær. Can utterances as actions (as if an utterance was not already an action?) be described, Grønkjær asks, without a theory of the subject? Grønkjær also asks an intriguing question which one would have liked to have seen developed: can Kierkegaard’s Kærlighedens Gerninger be read as a weakening of the subject (a precursor of Vattimo’s pensiere debole)? Grøn defends his position with a claim that the subject is situated in between passivity and activity. I simply cannot see the meaning of it.

Løgstrup did not commit the naturalistic fallacy, Kees von Kooten Niekerk contends. Løgstrup does not argue from fact or the way things are (kendsgerninger, was derFall ist) to demand, but he does talk about a transition from the one to the other. It all depends on what a fact is. It is not to be understood as a scientific fact. Such facts are, we say now, constructed ones (Niekerk would not agree with this, I am sure). It is something ‘constated’ by ordinary language, Niekerk claims.

Niekerk as well as Wolf, like Logstrup himself, defend the view that there are always two ways in which you can access the world we live in: phenomenologically or all other ways. There are then two kinds of everything. A fact is never a fact; there are two facts. In fact, Søren Bruun asks this question in his response – what is a fact? No one, and that is a shame, discusses Vico’s verum factum-principle. We can understand a fact, because
we have made it. This is what Løgstrup discusses in his views on language in *Vidde og prægnans*.

Anders Lindseth, who is the only contributing non-theologian, in his essay somewhat, belies the anxiety expressed in the foreword. Løgstrup is being used today and now namely in Lindseth's context which is nursing and hospitals. In Norway, where Lindseth is a professor, Løgstrup's ethics is erroneously categorised as an ethics of presence (*nærhetsetik*), claims Lindseth. That sort of ethics is what characterises thinkers as diverse as Heidegger, Lévinas, Sartre, Buber and Løgstrup. Another word for it would be I-thou-philosophy. Ethics is not based on empathy or identification Lindseth seems to say. Competence is not necessary in order to respond to the ethical demand. For Lindseth, like for Wolf, life itself speaks to us in an unmediated way.

Svend Andersen’s theme is religion as interpretation or as I would prefer to call it - prodded by his paper - ‘reading’ (*tydning*). For as he remarks: *tydning* is not hermeneutic in the sense of interpreting texts, and I think he is right. What is it then? Løgstrup himself says it is the way in which we relate by means of language to historicity as opposed to the world of things. The latter world we refer to with language as signs, but the other world we ‘read’ (or interpret) perhaps performatively.

Svend Andersen points out – and this is as far as I am aware the first time this has been said – that in *The Ethical Demand* Løgstrup did not set out to produce or formulate a general or universal ethics. Most commentators seem to believe this was his intention. Løgstrup’s project was hermeneutic in the Bulmannian sense; he wished to reformulate the message (*kerygma*) in contemporary language. In this way *The Ethical Demand* becomes a work within the existential-theological tradition. This is a novel perspective on it. Really an eye-opener.

Svend Andersen critiques Løgstrup’s concept *tydning*; very little is left of Løgstrup’s work after this. Svend Andersen’s contribution is in a sense his farewell to his teacher: a remarkable farewell. *The Ethical Demand*'s leading idea is, he says, meaningless (p.134). When Løgstrup interprets he never interprets texts, Svend Andersen remarks. What is said about Jesus’ message is in no way based upon an interpretation of NT texts, so the question is, what is it Løgstrup interprets? The answer seems to be nothing. Løgstrup is, as Svend Andersen says, still a “kerygma-theologian (p. 136).” I am much intrigued by Svend Andersen’s reinterpretation of K.E. Løgstrup. It deserves much more attention than space allows me here. Let me therefore in defence of Løgstrup say this. Svend Andersen is wrong when he claims that what he calls “semantic resources” are to be found in religious texts or other texts. He is therefore also wrong when taking Løgstrup to task for not responding to such semantic resources, since they don’t exist. Andersen’s text theory is a kind of essentialism; or a romantic view of texts as somehow containing resources or potentialities, which we actualise when we read. Reading (*tydning*), I would claim, is intransitive; when we read or interpret texts we simply do not know what we read or interpret. Løgstrup therefore can speak about Jesus’ message without any reference to texts whatsoever, and even if he had interpreted texts that would not have had any impact on what he said.

I therefore tend to agree with the respondent Theodor Jørgensen. He is quite right in pointing out how problematic (and I would say Platonic) the idea entertained by Svend Andersen is which posits an identical or constant meaning behind the textual surface. Svend Andersen it appears has never escaped the prison house of analytical philosophy.
He suggests that a combination of elucidation of texts combined with phenomenology is a solution. So why does he not mention phenomenological textual theorists? There are plenty of them. He also mentions in passing Vattimo who identifies the return of religion with interpretation. According to Vattimo, and Nietzsche, there are no facts only interpretations. Therefore neither Niekerk or Andersen need worry about facts (kendsgerninger) or semantic resources.

The Norwegian theologian, Jan-Olav Henriksen, finally, addresses the problem of Løgstrup’s Christology. Since Løgstrup - as is well known - never used the word ‘Christ’ any christology must be found in a semantic resource hidden behind the textual surface. Henriksen does refer to the outside world of politics and culture. He has a sort of explanation as to why there is so little interest in Løgstrup: the time we live in does not ask for what is universal but for particularity and difference. Yet Løgstrup in fact struggled with the conflict between universality and difference and tried to transcend it. Løgstrup is not a ‘universalist’. He is a monist and this, as also Henriksen sees, is what is expressed in the Sartreian concept of the singular universal.

I cannot do justice to Henriksen’s well-documented and interesting article; I can only say that it seems to me he conflates soteriology and christology. Kirsten Busch Nielsen asks a relevant question. Is not Henriksen concerned with something different from Løgstrup? Namely christology.

BOOK REVIEW


by Tone Saxø, Assistant Professor, University College of Bergen, Norway

Introduction

Through its title, Enlightenment of Existence: A basic theme of K.E. Løgstrup, this book sets up an immediate association with last century’s modernism, and with the notion of ‘enlightenment’ as one of the main concepts of that epoch. The author, Hans Henningsen, carefully contextualizes Løgstrup’s pedagogical works within his stimulating understandings of enlightenment, while also providing a thorough description of the appropriate cultural and historical background. Accordingly, Henningsen says in the preface that the object of the book is to offer a comprehensive presentation of Løgstrup’s works about education and pedagogy. This intention is fair enough. Unfortunately, a more critical or detached questioning is missing with respect to the pedagogical and philosophical relevance of Løgstrup works to our present day reality, characterized by postmodernism, globalization and multiculturalism.

‘Enlightenment of existence’ is both title and major theme of this book. It is also the concept with which Løgstrup re-worded and pursued the Danish enlightenment tradition begun by Grundtvig. As a concept, it is at the same time direct and indirect, simple and complex. Throughout the book, the author, Henningsen, examines the various aspects of
‘enlightenment of existence’ by extensively using Løgstrup’s works as well as secondary sources.

The notions ‘enlightenment’ and ‘enlightenment of existence’ need an initial clarification although they will be more closely explained later on in this review. First, Løgstrup considers ‘enlightenment of existence’ to be the primary task of pedagogy whereas education as such becomes a secondary concern. Løgstrup’s work is a reaction to the Kantian view of enlightenment as the emancipation of the human from self-inflicted constraints. According to Kant, the task of enlightenment is empowerment and independence (see for instance Løgstrup 1956). Løgstrup does not reject this idea, but he only considers it partially. In addition to emancipation, the enlightenment spirit above all wants to understand the world and human existence. With the term ‘enlightenment of existence’, Løgstrup more strongly expresses its universal reach and the significance of dealing with all areas of human existence in pedagogy.

Some key terms like ‘pedagogy’, ‘education’ and ‘school’, may also need some clarification, as their meanings are somewhat different in Anglo- American countries compared to the Scandinavian and continental context. The term ‘pedagogy’ is more comprehensive than ‘education’, and is dependent on values and philosophy of life. So ‘pedagogy’ emphasizes the adult’s full personal and moral responsibility for the child. The didactic term ‘education’ is, in contrast, associated with preparation for work and the development of competencies in well-defined subject areas. The term ‘school’ both refers to the cultural institution and to the pedagogical work that takes place there.

Løgstrup’s perspectives on education are part of his complex interpretation of human existence, and his significant creation-oriented, pre-cultural approach to life and pedagogy is quite distinct. Henning森 possesses a thorough and extensive knowledge of Løgstrup and offers a well written, interesting and relatively demanding text. His target group of readers is broad, as is the general interest in education. The author addresses people of various professions and areas, involved in the matter of ‘enlightenment’. As such this book cannot be characterized as a textbook on pedagogy and education, but it can be considered as a contribution to the broader philosophical discourse on pedagogy and society.

Enlightenment and society
In the initial chapters, Henning森 introduces the cultural-theological background of Løgstrup’s involvement in questions related to school and to the enlightenment of people in general. The basis is what in Denmark is called the ‘Tidehvervs-Grundtvigianism’, an expansion and re-vitalisation of the philosophical tradition of N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). This particular tradition is very Danish and also echoes some of the philosophical thinking of the time in the rest of Scandinavia and the Continent.

Løgstrup, according to Henning森, is deeply committed to the autonomy of the human being, who through openness and information can influence democracy. His thoughts here are not party-political, but profoundly cultural-political. The conditions of democracy are, first of all, trust in human beings to behave with humanity, and the acceptance of a certain tension between the ‘I’ and life. He sees human beings as ‘inserted’ in life, rather than outwardly observing life. As such the different ‘I’s’ of the world are interdependent in a way that involves a dialogue which breaks the subject – object relationship between humans and the things of the world. According to Løgstrup, the
democratic enlightening of people is based on the ontological view that ‘you’ and ‘I’ are both related to the world by something that is other and greater than us. In the dialogue between us, the words create a spiritual and personal world in which ‘you’ and ‘I’ can relate.

When it comes to policy making and enlightenment, the author points to Logstrup’s defence of the role of ideas in politics, which is in danger of being sacrificed to the power of expert knowledge. In addition to the rationality of the know-how competence, the comprehension of feelings, ideas and moods are significant to the coherence in culture and policy. According to our experience, these modes of recognition are both sensory and cognitive and include the element of pathetic understanding. Logstrup claims that behind political disagreement there is a possibility of a more profound agreement of discourse based on common experience of existence and ethics.

Henningsen further stresses that, according to Logstrup, the notion of ‘enlightenment’ represents the overall experience, compared with science. It is the concrete and complex world where science is only one of the areas of human activity. Science always reduces the complexity of the world so that it is able to investigate and explain it. In this way science and enlightenment are interdependent of each other in their service to humankind. Still, enlightenment and reality always have to be equally complex. Logstrup criticizes an unreserved confidence in rationality. He trusts enlightenment to ensure that there is a ‘time for objections’ in science. By this, he means that there should be time between the conception and the realization of a project long enough for its side effects to be discovered. Objections have a ‘heuristic effect’, he claims, as questioning is needed, so we may become aware of the possible problems of a project (p.66). Enlightenment as such communicates with science, yet is not about the science itself. Rather it speaks of the conditions of science, and of the entities from which the sciences emanate and of which they are integral parts.

Enlightenment and ideology are, according to Logstrup, absolutely contradictory, as ideology has to be a simplification. Also science may become ideological if it reaches the quality of a worldview (p.58). The more scientific the society, the more we require enlightenment of existential, philosophical, ethical, artistic and political character. The concept of enlightenment is held by Logstrup to be closely related to a particular situation, which science according to its nature cannot be. The variations of the representative situations in our existence are unique and so is the constellation of the present factors. This being so, Logstrup considers any kind of moral casuistry inappropriate and recommends a situational approach to ethical questions. This attitude makes the enlightenment a never-ending intention, as every situation, every problem and every time has its own enlightenment.

The enlightenment of pedagogy
Henningsen emphasizes Logstrup’s notion of enlightenment as depriving the human being of an elevated sovereignty above and ‘outside’ the universe, and reinstating him at his place in Creation. These thoughts are seen as the ‘self-reflection of modernity’ (p.78), and resist an interpretation of life with a horizon limited to our own time and society. Logstrup does not intend to omit our bond with nature and history and the ‘supportive basis of life’, in which human beings are ‘embedded’. This ‘supporting basis of life’ refers to the basic elements that we, as human beings, are dependent on to sustain life. In
Løgstrup’s thinking, what belongs to nobody is closely related to enlightenment. In his view, the scope of enlightenment is the entire human and natural world inlaid in a universal and cosmic ontology:

“Enlightenment of existence is the enlightenment of our existence with and against one another, the enlightenment of the organization of society and the course of history, [the enlightenment] of the nature in which we are embedded with our breath and metabolism, and of the universe of which we are inlaid with our senses” (p.134)(my translation).

Our basis belongs to ‘nobody’, he says, meaning thereby first of all the elements, the language and the child. Løgstrup deals with the notion of the child who belongs to nobody, in his Metaphysics III. Henningsen, however, does not take this idea any further. The understanding of the child as nobody’s has significance to Løgstrup’s pedagogical thoughts and to pedagogy in general, as pedagogy usually is understood as a personal and normative relation between adult and child. A thorough elaboration would have been of great interest particularly to the theme of this book. Besides, the view of the child as nobody’s is an assertion that may easily be misunderstood in a pedagogical context. For instance, one may wonder if the notion reflects a lack of responsibility on the part of the adult towards the child or even a devaluation of the child as a human being.

Henningsen presents Løgstrup’s thinking of enlightenment as complex as existence itself, the task of which should be to carefully tell about everything that is ongoingly elemental to life. The elementary supporting basis of life also includes the ‘sovereign expression of life’, which is the pre-ethical, spontaneous goodness between us, seen for instance in trust and mercy. Enlightenment as such may transcend the complex human world, in order to obtain an overview and see the coherence and continuity of life. Enlightenment maintains the complexity, obstacles and intricacies of life, and does not give in to the forces of simplification, ideologification, technification and expert-power. Simplifications, not complexities threaten life, he says, as reality itself is complex and contrasted. Enlightenment cannot change these facts, but should rather elucidate life as it is. (p.80).

Løgstrup re-vitalizes from Grundtvig the thought of the ‘living interaction’ as an intentional reciprocal action between all aspects of life, and by considering all issues in the light of an open and coherent evaluation. Henningsen here refers to Løgstrup’s differentiation between information and enlightenment. The root of the word ‘inform’ is understood as the image of the form that somehow is shaped into the mind of the receiver. The attitude of the receiver is shaped by that, of which he or she is informed. ‘Enlighten’, on the contrary, is related to the image of a particular case brought out in the light of the day, for all to see and on their own behalf to take an attitude towards. (pp. 61, 62). So enlightenment should not be an enlightenment of the people, but enlightenment in the people. The frame of enlightenment is the general public, where everybody may speak and the experts are obliged to partake in the dialogue.

This fundamental understanding of enlightenment, Løgstrup applies towards education, which he apprehends may take over all space in school. Henningsen points out that Løgstrup considers education at school as a yield (Danish: 'afkast') of the enlightenment of existence (p. 134). Løgstrup foresaw and feared today’s tendency
towards a result-oriented preoccupation with efficiency and effectiveness in education, replacing the broader human intentions of pedagogy. He rejected the substitution of upbringing with socialization, and the relational notions of ‘teaching’ and ‘school’ being traded for education and qualification. Throughout all his work, his unequivocal attitude is that the main concern of schools should be related to the questions of existence, and, ultimately, such teaching is an ‘impossible challenge’ and so it should be. Løgstrup rejects that the open areas of life in some way or another should need justification to become relevant to society or school. Enlightenment exists primarily for its own sake, yet should be accommodated appropriately within pedagogy. His view of school, as a ‘place of refuge’ where students and teachers are fully engrossed and indulged in the working out of common interests, underlines his view of the close relation between enlightenment and pedagogy.

Henningsen introduces Løgstrup’s pedagogical works within the political radicalism of the 1970’s. Løgstrup responded to the idea of a culture of emancipation, and indicated that by exclusively stressing emancipation, the sense of significant parts of our basis of existence may be lost. In particular, he suspected that perception, language and the ‘supporting elements’ of nature and human life, would be culturally forgotten. He saw these elements as presuppositions to the display of life, not in themselves a product of human activity. Still by their nature, he claimed, they remain outside the reach of emancipation, and are therefore close to being expelled from the epoch. The elements at risk are, for instance, nature (the water, the air and the earth, which belong to nobody), the shared possibility of language, and the main source of the future, i.e. the child him or herself. Related to language he emphasizes especially that the human ‘spontaneous idea’ (Danish: ‘indfald’), should be given a place of significance in life. The significance of the spontaneous idea is, according to Løgstrup, superior to the significance of purpose. Language itself incites the spontaneous idea if we allow it (p. 209). But language then has to be seen as nobody’s, and simply belonging to the conditions of life.

The subject in focus
In the chapter ‘School and Pedagogy’, Henningsen asserts that Løgstrup strongly criticised an individualistic and functionalistic approach to pedagogy, and claims that there are ‘problems strictly internal to pedagogy that cannot simply be neglected’ (p. 84). By ‘problems strictly internal to pedagogy’ he seems to indicate the normativity of every pedagogical moment, and the fundamental openness of the child towards the world. Løgstrup sees a common openness to the things of the world as the characteristic origin of the relationship between human beings. He sees human existence as the basis of pedagogy. Neither the teacher nor the student is the primary focus of the pedagogical situation, but rather their interdependent relationship to existence. The basis for pedagogy is the situation and the particular structures of the world, where the immediate encounter between the child and surrounding things takes place. The pragmatic approach of John Dewey and the phenomenological approach of Hans Lipps are both important to pedagogy, according to Løgstrup. The first to maintain objectivity, and the latter for the integrity of pedagogy (p. 86). Løgstrup’s view of school clearly points in the direction of a phenomenological approach to pedagogical questions. The thoughts of the American psychologist Edith Cobb, on ‘wonder’ as the basic human quality in facing the phenomena of the world seems, as Henningsen suggests, an interesting perspective on Løgstrup’s
philosophy of the ‘expressions of life.’ Both authors seem to see the significance of ‘learning by wondering’ rather than ‘learning by doing’ (pp. 145, 146).

The ‘zone of inviolability’
Løgstrup suggests that human beings are directed towards each other, however, not towards the mental life of the other. The ‘zone of inviolability’ is meant to enclose the mental life. The acknowledgement of the ‘zone of inviolability’ is a basic condition of enlightenment. It has two effects according to Løgstrup: it protects the person, as well as it makes the dialogue between persons possible.

Still, the respect for the ‘zone of inviolability’ may result in reserve, rigidity and cold intellectualism. What prevents this from taking place, is a tension with the ‘openness of speech’, which helps us uncover our motives and call forth spontaneity. Together, the respect for the ‘zone of inviolability’ and the ‘openness of speech’ constitute what Løgstrup calls ‘unifying oppositions’. The child, more than the adult, is dependent on another person’s acknowledgement of his or her ‘zone of inviolability’. The pedagogical care for the child is challenged at this point. Children, in particular, are vulnerable to violation and in their exposed position are impulsive. Their trustfulness lacks the inclination of the adult to camouflage motives. This position may lead adults to be unaware or disrespectful of the boundaries between themselves and the child.

The ‘unifying oppositions’
This notion of life unfolding between opposites is original and fundamental to Løgstrup, according to Henningsen. Numerous phenomena from human life, perhaps all of them, he says, are given life and energy from the tension to which the phenomenon is related to another phenomenon, which, in certain respects, is opposite to it (p. 93). In pedagogy, the example of teacher authority may help to further elucidate this term. Løgstrup says that, through rational intentions, the students give the pedagogical authority of the teacher to him or her. On the other hand, the teacher may claim or ‘rob’ the authority of the class. But because the last-mentioned authority is not pedagogical, the pedagogical relationship between teacher and student, as well as the teaching context comes to an end. Furthermore, if the student rejects the authority of the teacher, this attitude will threaten the independence of the student. A personal independence exists only in tension with the acknowledgement of having something to learn from others.

The relevance of the ‘unifying oppositions’ to education is indubitable: first of all in the relationship between student and teacher, but also in their relation to the subject of interest, or in Løgstrup’s words: ‘the enlightenment of existence’. The traditional pedagogical paradox of the independence of the child coming of age, attained by the influential upbringing and education, is in Løgstrup’s eyes, not a paradox, but an example of ‘unified oppositions’ (pp. 99, 100).

School as a ‘place of refuge’
Løgstrup sees school as a ‘place of refuge’ for students and teachers to investigate the questions of existence. In his view, school should primarily relate to two main matters: the relation to a subject of interest and the togetherness between teacher and student in relating to this subject. Teacher and student are equal towards the subject, even if their tasks are different. The subject in a certain understanding creates the freedom in their
relationship (p. 139). The explorative attitude towards the things of the world implies equality between student and teacher. Still the concepts of ‘teacher’ and ‘student’, as such define the different parts they have in exploration. If the student refuses to accept this difference, he or she obstructs the receptiveness to the insight of the teacher. However, Løgstrup emphasizes that the student is the one to insist on the dissimilarity of the relation. On the other hand, the teacher should insist on the similarity. To Løgstrup, the idea of school is primarily to be together towards something, namely the enlightenment of the subject towards which the teaching turns. The subject states the reason and the motivation for the relationship between teacher and student.

The narrative
According to Henningsen, Løgstrup strongly emphasized the narrative or the ‘story’ in pedagogy. He considered the narrative to be of a particular significance because it represents the steady part of our culture. To the scientific or technological tradition, the future has the main focus and the past basically is of slight current interest. The tradition of the ‘unsolvable questions’ and the ‘steady’ part of culture, on the other hand, implies the stories and the history of the past, of religion, of philosophy, of literature and of art. These phenomena constitute the human attempts to meet the more steady aspects of life. To Løgstrup, the obvious imbalance of the two traditions shows that the narrative is required to support the enlightenment of existence, the main purpose of school. Still, the narrative is fragile by nature, facing the robust bias of technology. In school, Løgstrup claims, there should be room for all that cannot be rationalized. What cannot be rationalized is often considered less important, or subordinate, to the real enterprise of the school and has therefore, in a certain sense, no significance. However, these phenomena are existential in life, and therefore an aspect of enlightenment.

Concluding comments
As Henningsen writes in the preface, the book is a presentation of Løgstrup’s thoughts on enlightenment of existence. The author thoroughly sketches the historical, cultural, philosophical, and political backgrounds to support the pedagogical significance of enlightenment. The book is a comprehensive presentation of Løgstrup’s thoughts on school and pedagogy, and even more so since it motivates the reader to question Løgstrup’s thoughts and evokes interest for further readings.

What may be regarded as a significant identifier of Løgstrup’s philosophy is the closeness between the various areas of social life and human existence as such. This view also finds a certain support within continental pedagogy. The German pedagogue, O.F.Bollnow, for instance, clearly expresses the general attitude that what is significant to human life and existence, is also significant to pedagogy.

It is my hope that these links are apparent in my review of Henningsen’s book. I consider Løgstrup’s works on pedagogy and philosophy to be of great value to pedagogical practise, as well as to the human sciences. The material available from this book will indubitably ease the way for future researchers.

Henningsen’s book is somewhat unclear about the direct relevance of Løgstrup’s pedagogical ideas for today’s pedagogical and social reality. Even if the pedagogical relevance is to be found implicitly in sporadic comments besides the author’s concluding
summary, a clearly expressed discussion of the relation between Løgstrup’s pedagogical works and today’s pedagogical and social challenges is lacking.

Løgstrup developed his philosophy in the period from the 1930s and until his death in 1981. His relation to the German tradition of the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’, and in particular Hans Lipps, is well known. So is also his critique of and dissociation with Kant and Kierkegaard. Yet, what is his connection to contemporary philosophers in Europe and the Anglo American world? His thoughts are undoubtedly related to continental philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper, and to former European theologians. However, his contemporaries were also post-modern philosophers, such as Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard, who both profoundly questioned the main philosophical perspectives of modernity. Henningsen does not raise these concerns. Still, the point is not to question Løgstrup’s philosophy, which I consider to be on the level with that of his contemporaries, but rather to search for a broader context for the interpretation of his works. His pedagogical thoughts constitute a considerable and significant part of his philosophy and deserve a critical and relevant context for understanding and pursuance.

Comparable phenomenological philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose works clearly resemble Løgstrup’s, are today being discussed, criticized and re-interpreted in a way that I wish that also Løgstrup would be. For this to happen, his works as well as everything that has been written about him would have to be translated, discussed, compared and put to the test in a greater international scholarly context. The Scandinavian dimension that characterizes most works by and on Løgstrup today may create a problem of availability. In writing this review, I realize that Henningsen’s book, like most of Løgstrup’s own books and the secondary sources about him, urgently need to be translated into English. I cannot help imagining what Henningsen’s book would be like if it had been written in English and intended for an international audience from the outset.

Making texts available in English would provide a greater opportunity to further develop Løgstrup’s significant and distinctive philosophy and the circumstances by which his philosophy came into being, as well as extend the number of qualified interpreters of his works. His distinctive cultural and philosophical style would not fade, but rather become more complex and interesting by encounters with other cultures and philosophical views. When it comes to pedagogy in particular, I wonder what would come out of a current multicultural interpretation of Løgstrup, in order to increasingly develop a deeper pedagogical understanding of his philosophical contributions. I cherish great expectations of possible future work in this area.

WORKING WITH AN ACADEMIC SCRAP BOOK

by Christian Koch Ramsing, employee at the State and University Library in Aarhus

In March 2002 I was assigned by the State and University Library in Aarhus to make an on-line and publicly accessible catalogue of Rosemarie and K.E. Løgstrup’s private book collection, which has been donated to the Løgstrup Archive by Rosemarie Løgstrup. The task was completed in December 2002, and the catalogue database now makes it possible
for the public to search and perhaps find new aspects and perspectives in the thinking of K.E. Logstrup.

The following is a short description of how the catalogue was made and how, during this work, I had the experience of turning the pages of a great academic scrap book.

The State and University Library designed a format for the catalogue, which was based on the type and form of information requested by the Løgstrup Archive to be communicated through the catalogue. This format contained three main areas of description: 1) a bibliographic description, 2) a subject description, and 3) a registration of dedications, marginal jottings, papers with notes or drafts, press cuttings and other significant slips of paper put into the books. Each area of description presented its own challenges and gave a great insight into the academic lives of Rosemarie and K.E. Løgstrup.

The heart of a library catalogue is the **bibliographic description**, the purpose of which is to store information about a document (i.e. a book) in order to be able to identify it in an information retrieval. The format for the Løgstrup catalogue was designed with four fields for the bibliographic description: two for the name of the main author, one for the title and one for the publishing information. The primary challenge in this area of description was to extract as much information as possible from the books and use this information in an accurate and uniform way within the narrow boundaries of the catalogue format. When feasible, information about co-author, illustrator, series statement and multi-volume publications was added to the description.

Being a student at the Faculty of Theology, Department of the Study of Religion, at the University of Aarhus, I found the **subject description** of the books to be the most interesting and rewarding challenge of the three areas of description. Working my way through the book collection, I compiled a list of adequate subject headings in close collaboration with Kees van Kooten Niekerk, Associate Research Professor and head of the Løgstrup Archive. When compiling the list, I had to counterbalance between two opposing principles. First, the number of subject headings had to be limited for the sake of clarity in the search interface and, secondly, there had to be adequate expressions for all the subjects presented in the book collection. The final list of subject headings contained 35 entries on subjects, 8 entries on literary genres and 5 entries on significant authors.

Working out the right form and structure of subject headings is only one side of the very difficult and interesting task of subject cataloguing. The other side is to find the actual subject presented in each book. To find these subjects I tried to use a method called **request-oriented indexing**. This method was theoretically elaborated by professor Birger Hjørland at the Royal School of Library and Information Science in Copenhagen (“Information seeking and subject representation: an activity-theoretical approach to information science / Birger Hjørland. – Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997”). The essential point in request-oriented indexing is that a subject is always a subject for someone and that, in the description of the subject of a given document, the focus has to be on the relationship between the properties of the document and an anticipated user-need. Hjørland defines ‘subject’ as the **epistemological potentials of a document** and states that the way to describe the subject is through a **domain analysis**, which includes an epistemological, sociological and historical analysis of the knowledge domain in question. In this case the primary knowledge domains would be theology and philosophy and an ideal subject description
of the books in the collection would imply a thorough analysis of these domains. This is all very theoretical. In practice, I used my experience from being a student at the Faculty of Theology (and a potential user of the books) as a kind of pre-established domain analysis, on which to base the subject description. To make it as satisfactory as possible the scientific and non-fiction literature has been attributed up to three subject headings.

The final area of description was the registration of dedications, marginal jottings and papers with notes etc. The catalogue format was designed with two separate fields for this registration: one field for dedications and one for notes and papers. Although the many and lengthy dedications in the books are worth reading, they are not written out in the catalogue. Only name, time and place of the dedications are registered and they have the exact same form as stated in the books with initials and abbreviations. This makes a direct search of information about dedications possible, but slightly difficult. Some of the most interesting dedications that are worth reading in full are to be found in the books by the Danish poets and writers Thorkild Bjørnvig and Klaus Rifbjerg. Probably the most prominent dedication is one by Martin Heidegger in ‘Über den Humanismus’: “Für K.E. Løgstrup, Zur Erinnerung an die Begegnung bei einem Alt-Marbürger Treffen, Martin Heidegger, Freiburg i. Br., 2. Jan. 1975.”

The registration of the marginal jottings, notes and papers was occasionally the most extensive of the descriptions in the catalogue. Close to 500 pieces of paper with notes, more than 150 press cuttings and a countless number of marginal jottings have been registered. All the papers and press cuttings were removed from the books and stored in a separate archive with a clear catalogue reference to the original locations in the books. This reference thus makes it possible to search the catalogue database for information about a specific paper or press cutting as well as information about all the papers and press cuttings found in a specific book. The paper and press cutting archive contains many different kinds of notes and cuttings, including notes from K.E. Løgstrup’s time as a student in the 1920s, drafts of later articles and speeches and a lengthy summary of for instance “A System of Logic” by John Stuart Mill as well as press cuttings of book reviews, interviews and articles about (and by) colleagues and friends of Rosemarie and K.E. Løgstrup.

Where the bibliographic and subject descriptions have revealed a unique collocation of books that might indicate professional preferences and show some of the personal interests of study, the registration of dedications, jottings and notes have shown
both respectful professional as well as warm personal liaisons with Danish and international scholars and intellectuals.

In addition to being a detailed source of information for the scientific and intellectual study of K.E. Løgstrup’s thinking, the book collection as a whole thus stands as a large scrap book telling its own fragmented and inspiring story of Rosemarie and K.E. Løgstrup’s academic lives.

BRIEF NOTES

On last year’s workshop about The Significance of Løgstrup’s Ethics, the Danish Broadcast Corporation (Danmarks Radio) interviewed a number of the participants about Løgstrup’s ethics. These interviews were broadcasted (in Danish) in two programmes on 16 and 23 May 2002. They can be heard by specifying the dates under: www.dr.dk/p1/eksistens/arkiv.asp.

Not only the database on Løgstrup’s posthumous manuscripts but also the database on Rosemarie and K.E. Løgstrup’s book collection is now accessible for on-line search. Please go to www.teo.au.dk/accbaser/logstrup/Logstrup.asp and choose the database you want to consult. You can also enter the databases via ‘Use of the Archive’ on the Løgstrup Archive’s website (www.loegstrup.au.dk).
The papers, comments and background information presented at last year’s workshop on *The Significance of Løgstrup’s Ethics* will be published by the University of Notre Dame Press (for information about the contents, please consult the first issue of this newsletter, see [www.loegstrup.au.dk](http://www.loegstrup.au.dk)). Moreover, extracts from Løgstrup’s ethical writings after *The Ethical Demand* will be published in a separate volume by the same publisher. These extracts include Løgstrup’s rejoinder to criticism levelled against *The Ethical Demand*, his major accounts of the ‘sovereign expressions of life’ and some of his political elucidations. Both books will appear in the course of the next year.

A course on *Kierkegaard og Løgstrup - Eksistens og ophav* (*Kierkegaard and Løgstrup - Existence and Source*) will be held from 29 June - 5 July at Tøstrup Højskole (DK). This course focuses on the similarities between Kierkegaard and Løgstrup rather than on the substantial differences. Both thinkers were, for example, interested in the relationship between immediacy and decision in human life, both regarded human beings in relation to a divine authority, both emphasized the limits of science, and both were concerned with the role of aesthetics. For more information, go to [www.testrup.dk - korte kurser - Kierkegaard](http://www.testrup.dk - korte kurser - Kierkegaard).